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PROLOGUE

This paper discusses occupational disease in the United States—
its causes, history and the government agencies responsible for either
controlling it or compensating those who develop it.
serious one.

The issue is a

As this paper will discuss, exposure to many of the

chemicals used in modern industrial processes can cause severe health
problems, including some kinds of cancer.
Federal regulation of such workplace hazards did not begin until
1970, when the Occupational Safety and Health Act was passed.
established two agencies:

The act

The Occupational Safety and Health Adminis

tration (OSHA) to promulgate and enforce workplace standards, and the
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), to study
workplace hazards and recommend standards and safety practices to
control them.
The two agencies are now a decade old.

Their job has been and is a

difficult one because of widespread industry hostility and, to some
extent, lack of support from the executive branch.

OSHA in particular

has suffered innumerable court challenges and Administration attempts to
weaken standards that could cost industry a great deal of money.

This

paper will discuss the responsibilities and performance of these two
agencies during the past ten years and the implications of the major
court cases on occupational health standards.
This paper will also examine the severe problems with compensation
for occupational illnesses.

Aside from the plan for federal employees,
iii
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the states have complete control of compensation plans, and the adequacy
of these plans is highly questionable.

Very few workers with occupa

tional diseases can obtain compensation benefits because it is so diffi
cult to prove a definite causal relationship with workplace exposure.
For example, studies may show an abnormally high lung cancer rate among
workers in a particular industry.

But a worker in that industry would

generally be unable to receive compensation for his/her illness because
it is argued that lung cancer is not unique to that occupation and could
be attributable to genetic susceptibility, outside exposure and a
worker's personal habits such as cigarette smoking.

This problem of

proof is reflected in the fact that most workers disabled by occupational
disease must seek relief from other service programs such as social
security.
Public interest in occupational health problems has grown with the
evolution of the two new health agencies, although there have been few
books written on the subject.

Of these, the earliest, written in the

early 1970s, are now out of print.

These books illustrate an almost

sudden awareness among the media, public interest groups and legal/
medical professionals of workplace problems that had existed for years.
The first of these. Bitter Wages, was a 1973 Ralph Nader Study Group
report written by a professor and a student at Georgetown University
Law Center.

That same year. Expendable Americans by Paul Brodeur was

published, and Muscle and Blood by Rachel Scott was published in 1974.
The Nader study is an extremely valuable introduction to occupa
tional health issues.

It presents a fairly detailed description of the

lack of adequate workplace health and safety regulations, but most of

V

the research for the book was done during

and immediately after passage

of the OSH Act, so its evaluation of OSHA

and NIOSHdoes little beyond

speculate what these agencies could and should do.
Both Expendable Americans and Muscle

and Blood concentrate essen

tially on the shock value of simply outlining the many severe health
problems among American workers.

Brodeur focused on the almost unbeliev

able rate of respiratory disease among asbestos workers, a logical
subject because asbestosis was one of the first occupational diseases,
along with black lung, to be recognized by the medical community.
Scott provides a broader look at industry health problems.

Her book

is based on a series of investigations of different industries, including
the East Helena lead smelter.

Although her approach is somewhat biased,

apparently assuming that every health official she encountered was an
industry tool, her detailed descriptions of hazardous working conditions
are a valuable introduction to both workplace processes and their asso
ciated hazards.
Brodeur's and Scott's criticism of public health officials is a
result of a number of factors.

Both are newspaper reporters, a position

which may breed familiarity with but not often respect for the acts of
public officials.

More important, both were writing during the formative

years of federal workplace regulation, years dominated by a Republican
Administration hardly sympathetic to an agency which aroused widespread
ire among industrial concerns.

Also, as will be discussed, industrial

health research had for many years been dominated by industry and/or
industry consultants, and both OSHA and NIOSH had to rely on these people
initially because of the few qualified industrial health personnel.
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There were no other widely distributed commercial books on occupa
tional health until 1978 when Daniel Berman's Death on The Job and
Samuel Epstein's The Politics of Cancer were published.

Berman's book

is based on the work he did to earn his Ph.D. in political science at
St. Louis's Washington University.

A very detailed book, its only fault

is that it seems to assume an almost intuitive awareness on the part of
the reader of the complicated interrelationships among public health
officials, industry consultants, union leaders and medical people.
However, if one can get past the confusing acronyms, Berman presents the
most comprehensive examination of the agencies, issues, unions, consul
tants and health officials currently available.
Epstein, who is a professor of occupational and environmental
medicine at the University of Illinois's School of Public Health,
presents the medical side of the picture.

His book examines not only

occupational carcinogens, but environmental and possible food carcinogens
and the curious lack of emphasis placed on these by most cancer
researchers.

This is undoubtedly the best source on the current status

of health agencies and health researchers.
These books resemble those of the muckrackers whose books first
examined workplace problems in the early 1900s.

And just as the muck-

rackers excited public interest and sparked some (mostly inadequate)
government response, these books may be at least partially responsible
for what appears to be a somewhat more aggressive government stance on
workplace health problems recently.

In the past two years, the federal

government released two important, and shocking, papers on occupational
health.

The first, released by the Department of Health, Education and

vil
Welfare, estimated that at least 20% of all cancers were occupationally
related, compared with previous estimates of between 1% and 10%.

The

second report, released as a draft by the Labor Department in late 1979,
found that fewer than 20% of workers seriously disabled by occupational
disease can receive compensation under the present systems.
This paper will use these reports, the few broad journalistic over
views of health problems discussed above, some very valuable General
Accounting Office critiques, interviews with agency officials, and trends
obvious in newspaper coverage to discuss occupational health problems.
The author believes that a discussion of this sort is valuable for
several reasons:
1.

It is a reviewand an update of the critical journalistic

examination representedby books such as Muscle and Blood.

This approach

is valuable because any agency, whatever its function, is often influenced
by those it was created to regulate.
assumes that a non-specialist can

The broad journalistic approach

(and should) critically examine the

performance of a government agency, thereby assessing whether it is
fulfilling its original purpose.
2.

There has been little recognition among those examining occupa

tional health problems of the potentially severe problems posed by
increasing demands that occupational health standards be justified by
cost/benefit analyses.

Cost/benefit analyses assume that future costs

and future benefits can be predicted fairly accurately and then balanced
to provide an optimum decision.

The problem when applying this concept

to occupational health standards is that current medical knowledge cannot
pinpoint the level at which any pollutants will not cause future health
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effects.

Health agencies may make educated guesses, but they rarely can

state that a particular level will save X number of lives; they may be
able to estimate the costs of a standard, but rarely the precise benefits.
This paper will discuss the important court cases on this issue.
3.

Despite the magnitude of the problem, there has been little

critical review of the compensation concept and how well it is working
in a m odem industrial society.

This paper will discuss compensation

(or lack of it) for occupational diseases and the few attempts to amend
compensation systems.
4.

Most important, perhaps, is that occupational health is an

environmental issue, perhaps the environmental issue because the stakes,
in terms of lives, are so high.

In the past 15 years, environmentalists

have battled to maintain a high quality of life in communities, agricul
tural areas and forests, but have paid little attention to the workplace
environment, where many workers are being exposed to relatively high
levels of chemicals rarely encountered by the general public.

Relative

to allowable ambient pollution levels, or levels allowed outside of
industrial facilities, workplace pollution standards are incredibly high,
often around ten times those allowed by federal and state ambient
standards.

Hopefully, this paper can set a basis for future research on

these issues.
Although this paper initially focuses on the OSH Act and its conse
quences, particularly in Montana, the following history will first
examine the beginning of compensation systems because these were started
before most occupational health organizations and agencies.

vlx
Because this paper mentions a plethora of agencies and organizations,
all of which have acronyms, a list of these acronyms follows to help the
reader avoid possible confusion.

Acronyms
American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygenists...........AGGIE
American Industrial Health Council................................AIHC
American National Standards Institute............................. ANSI
Bureau of Labor Statistics....................................... BLS
General Accounting Office........................................ GAO
Industrial Health Foundation..................................... IHF
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health............. NIOSH
Occupational Safety and Health Administration..................... OSHA

Chapter 1

OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH ISSUES IN THE UNITED STATES— A BRIEF HISTORY

Since the Occupational Safety and Health Act was passed in 1970, the
public has become increasingly aware of the many dangers in the nation's
workplaces, particularly the dangers posed by exposure to chemicals now
known to be carcinogenic.

The environmental movements of the late 1960s

and early '70s, which aroused concern about the effects of uncontrolled
industrial processes on human health and welfare, spawned much of this
concern.

The environmental movement began when the massive industrial

ization of western society which followed World War II began to affect
entire communities, in some cases entire regions.

Before the 1960s, when

terms such as smog and the greenhouse effect became commonplace, pollution
episodes and public concern about them were limited to highly industri
alized areas such as Donora, Pennsylvania, when a three-day inversion
trapped pollution in the valley, killing 20 people and causing 6,000 to
become ill.^
It was not until pollution began degrading the quality of middleclass life, causing offensive odors, limited visibility and burning eyes,
that the public and the media took notice of the side effects of progress.
It is significant that the event which initially caused widespread ire
over increasing pollution was the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill, fouling
the beaches in that affluent community.
Workplace health, on the other hand, was often an invisible issue.
Workers lived and died ignored unless a strike threatened to interrupt
1
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the flow of consumer goods.

In the late 1800s and early 1900s, a period

which witnessed both the birth of the great industrial giants and the
peak of immigration into the United States, the emerging industries took
advantage of a workforce that was cheap and easily replaced.

Dr. Alice

Hamilton, a pioneer in industrial hygiene, studied lead poisoning among
workers in 1910 and 1911 and commented:
I remember a foreman saying to me, as we watched the (lead)
enamelers at work: 'They won't last long at it. Four years
at the most, I would say, then they quit and go home to the
old country.' 'To die?' I asked. 'Well, I suppose that's
about the size of it,' he answered.^
Dr. Hamilton was one of the few professionals at the time investi
gating the often appalling workplace conditions.

In 1907 alone, 3,842

men were killed in the anthracite and bituminous coal mines, and 4,534
railroad workers were killed on the job.

o

The muckrackers, who chronicled

the excesses of the great industrial monopolies, attracted some public
attention to the problems.

Perhaps the best known of their works is

Upton Sinclair's The Jungle, published in 1906, which depicted life in
and around Chicago's slaughterhouses through the eyes of a young immi
grant .

In one of Sinclair's more memorable scenes, he described one

small aspect of the meat packing business:
There were men in the pickle rooms, for instance . . . scarce
a one of these that had not some spot of horror on his person.
Let a man so much as scrape his finger pushing a truck in the
pickle rooms, and he might have a sore that would put him out
of the world; all the joints in his fingers might be eaten by
the acid, one by one. Of the butchers and floorsmen, the beef
boners and trimmers, and all those who used knives, you could
scarcely find a person who had the use of his thumb; time and
time again the base of it had been slashed till it was a mere
lump of flesh against which the man pressed the knife to hold
it.4
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Sinclair’s book resulted in a government investigation which led to
the passage of the pure food laws.

But it took a major tragedy to focus

attention on the plight of the workers themselves.
On March 25, 1911, the upper three stories of the ten-story Triangle
Shirtwaist Building in New York City caught fire.

There was only one

fire escape in the building, and its doors opened inward, trapping the
workers vdio pressed against them trying to escape.
six people, most of them women, died.

One hundred and forty

According to one newspaper account

of the fire:
They were jammed into the windows. They were burning to death
in the windows. One by one the window jams broke. Down came
the bodies in a shower, burning, smoking, flaming bodies, with
disheveled hair trailing upward. These torches, suffering ones,
fell inertly.
The floods of water from the firemen's hoses that ran into the
gutter were actually red with blood. I looked upon the heap of
dead bodies and I remembered these girls were the shirtwaist
makers. I remembered their strike of last year in which these
same girls had demanded more sanitary conditions and more safety
precautions in the shops. These dead bodies were the answer.^
The building's owners were acquitted, and the fire's survivors
received no compensation.

But the incident brought about demands for

reform, particularly in laws governing employer liability.

Until the

turn of the century, an employee could claim damages for a job-related
injury only by suing the employer; in some states, a worker's survivors
had no recourse to legal action.

Under the negligence laws, the burden

of proof was on the employee, and an employer had three fairly effective
defenses :
1.

Contributory negligence.

This excused the employer from lia

bility if it could be shown the injured worker was in any way
responsible for the accident.
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2.

Fellow servant doctrine.

If another worker contributed to the

accident, the employer was not liable.

This concept had its

roots in the 1842 case of Farwell v. Boston and Worcester
Railroad Company. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the
employer’s liability was governed by an implied contract
between the employer and the employee, and that contract did
not inlcude the negligence of anyone but the employer.^
3.

Assumption-of-risk.

This was based on the view that a worker

could and would drive a hard bargain if employed at a risky
job.

It had its roots in the English case Priestly v. Fowler

in which a butcher boy’s helper was injured.

The court ruled

that a servant was not bound to risk safety in the service of
an employer and could therefore decline employment.^
The assumption-of-risk concept was sometimes taken to extremes.

In

a 1924 New York case, a girl who contracted tuberculosis after working in
a damp dirty cellar was denied compensation.

As the judge severely stated:

The plaintiff was fully aware of the conditions under which
she worked and continued the employment from June to December
in spite of such knowledge. . . .
It is common knowledge that
such conditions are deleterious to health. The plaintiff is
chargeable with such knowledge.®
The difficulty of winning a negligence suit posed a grave societal
burden.

Disabled workers and their families were forced to depend on

private and public charities.

Several states passed laws attempting to

limit employers’ defenses in negligence cases.

In 1908, 27 states had

outlawed work contracts which removed employer liability, and many had
modified the fellow-servant doctrine, making supervisors liable representatives of employers.

9
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But these provisions did little to increase the number of injury
awards, and many states formed commissions to investigate how to alle
viate the problem.

Between 1909 and 1913, there were 40 such investi

gations in 32 jurisdictions.

Their findings indicated that about 7/8 of

all work injuries received no financial compensation.

In a followup

study of 604 fatalities in New York, Minnesota and Pennsylvania before
1911, it was found that 33% received no award and 48% received less than
$500.

The New York state commission found that those workers who did

receive awards paid 30% to 50% of their recoveries in legal costs.10
The commissions almost unanimously concluded that the negligence
tort system was based on an anachronistic assumption of individual fault
and did not consider the nature of m o d e m industry with its chemicals,
mechanization and complex processes.

The commissions recommended that

states adopt compensation systems based on the concept of faultless
liability.

Businesses would pay monthly premiums, based on the size of

their workforce, into a fund used to compensate injured workers.

Workers

covered by this system would then forfeit their right to sue for addi
tional damages.
Compensation systems were not new.
for a compensation system in Germany.

In 1884, Otto Bismarck pushed
His primary concern was to dimin

ish the growing socialist influence in that country by giving workers
automatic compensation for workplace injuries.

Although workers paid

the premiums, the German system was relatively progressive;

Injured

workers received free medical treatment and compensation of up to 2/3 of
their original wages.H

6

England passed a compensation law in 1897 which allowed condensation
for injuries "arising out of and in the course of employment," the
language now used in most U.S. compensation systems.

The English system

initially covered only hazardous industries such as mining, but employers
paid the premiums.
Maryland passed the first U.S. compensations statute in 1902.

It

covered only deaths and was limited to mining, quarrying, railroads and
municipal construction.

It was declared unconstitutional in less than

two years because it "deprived the parties of the right of trial by jury
and . . . conferred judicial functions on the insurance commissioner, an
executive official.
This marked the beginning of a struggle between state legislatures
and the courts on the constitutionality of compensation statutes.

The

main issues were state police or regulating power versus what the courts
viewed as employers* right to trial by jury.
For example, Montana passed the nation's first compulsory compen
sation statute in 1909.

It set up a special state fund, covering only

coal mining, to be paid for by both employers and employees.
the state supreme court declared

In 1911,

the law unconstitutional, ruling that

it subjected employers to double liability because they had to contribute
to the fund but could still be sued.
The major case challenging the compensation concept was Ives v .
S. Buffalo, which overturned the New York compensation law.

The law

applied to only eight "especially dangerous" occupations, but it was
challenged on the ground that it violated due process of both state and
federal constitutions.

In fact, the New York Court of Appeals in its
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decision declared that the law was "plainly revolutionary" and unconsti
tutional because It arbitrarily took the property of A and gave It to
New York responded by passing a second law In 1914 which carefully
stipulated that adherence was elective.

The legislature then severely

limited the common law defenses of employers who opted out.

Because of

court hostility to compensation systems, most states followed New York’s
lead and adopted statutes which did not require compensation but limited
legal defenses without It.

Only Washington Initially adopted a compul

sory law, and the state supreme court not only upheld the act. It chas
tised the Ives decision.
After the Ives decision, courts began to uphold states* right to
require compensation.

By 1917, the U.S. Supreme Court had affirmed the

constitutionality of New York’s law (by then compulsory, although It
allowed Insurance through private companies), Iowa’s elective law and
Washington’s exclusive state fund.
By 1920, all but six states, most of them In the South, had some
form of compensation.

In 1948, Mississippi became the last state to

pass a law; Alaska and Hawaii both enacted laws as territories.

18

The challenges to compensation to some extent shaped current systems.
Only six states have an exclusive state system. *

Other states have a

state compensation fund, but also allow companies to self-insure and buy
premiums from private Insurance conq>anles.

New Jersey, South Carolina

and Texas do not require compensation Insurance, but uncovered employers
have few common law defenses In negligence suits.

19

*Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming

8

Some of the larger industries had supported and/or started their
own compensation systems before the states did.

In 1910, U.S. Steel

started a compensation system based on Bismarck's plan, called the
Voluntary Accident Relief Plan, which paid a fixed amount for disability
or death with the stipulation that the worker and his family could not
s u e .

20

In 1900, a coalition of large corporations founded the National

Civic Foundation, which lobbied for compensation to "substitute a fixed
but limited charge for a variable potentially ruinous one."

The founda-

tion later wrote compensation models later used by many states.
As Ralph Nader's Study Group noted " . . .

21

Workmen's compensation

made excellent business sense, and for that reason powerful business
interests backed its adoption."

22

Compensation removed, in most cases,

the threat of lawsuits against employers and allowed them to pay a rela
tively small premium to pay off injured employees.
Both industry and political leaders were well aware of growing
worker unrest and its implications.

Industry supported such mild reforms

as compensation because they at least initially appeased workers without
changing the basic economic system.

President Theodore Roosevelt recom

mended mediation in the 1902 athracite coal strike after he realized
that public support for the miners could accelerate beyond demands for
better wages and working conditions.

23

But the new compensation laws by no means solved workplace safety
and health problems.

Compensation allowed industry to avoid the large

awards and bad publicity sometimes associated with negligence suits.
The system did not (and does not, as will be discussed) provide much
impetus to correct workplace problems, particularly those involving

9

health.

As with the spur toward compensation, it took a major disaster

to focus attention on some workplace conditions.
In 1930, the New Kanawha Power Company, a Union Carbide subsidiary,
began work on a three-mile tunnel to carry water from the New River in
West Virginia to its new power plant.

The six-year project, which

employed about 4,000 workers, bored through rock composed primarily of
silica, a very fine dust now known to cause silicosis, an emphysema-like
disease.

The employers made no attempt to protect workers from the dust,

although they gave supervisors respirators.

24

Estimates of death among

the workers in what is now called the Gauley Bridge Disaster range from
OK

200 to 2,000, although the official number is about 470.

Silicosis

victims could not get compensation in West Virginia at the time, and the
injured workers were forced to sue.

In these suits, the average awards

ranged from $80 to $250 for blacks and $250 to $1,000 for whites.
After the Gauley Bridge Disaster and the attendant publicity, a
number of industries began sponsoring workplace safety organizations.
Perhaps the most influential of these was the Industrial Hygiene Founda
tion (now the Industrial Health Foundation) founded in 1935 by the Mellon
Institute (now the Camegie-Mellon Institute) as "an association of
industries for the advancement of healthful working conditions."

27

IHF

had 225 members by 1940 and 400 members by the late 1960s, including
U.S. Steel, General Motors and Union Carbide.

28

The organization's

primary goal was to discourage any government regulation of workplace
safety and health.

As stated by the chairman of the membership committee:

One of the brilliant features of IHF is this: it is a volun
tary undertaking by industry to protect industrial health.
And where industry attacks a great social-economic problem
voluntarily, there is no necessity for government to step in
and regulate.29

10

Organizations like IHF were extremely influential because until the
OSH Act, workplace health and safety regulations and recommendations were
made primarily by voluntary groups. The most important standard-setting
organizations were the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and the
American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygenists (ACGIH) , both of
which use their own research and information provided by groups such as IHF.
Founded in 1918, ANSI develops "consensus" standards, which are
pollution limits or safety practices established by agreement among the
supposedly differing viewpoints in the organization's membership.
According to the Nader study, ANSI members include corporations, trade
associations, government agencies and private groups such as the National
Safety Council.

Only in the past decade have unions been represented.

ACGIH also develops consensus standards.

30

Founded in 1938, the

organization is less industry-oriented than ANSI, with a membership
composed mainly of state and federal industrial hygenists.

31

Although groups such as IHF and ANSI may seem little more than an
attempt by industry to ameliorate conditions caused by its own production
methods, their recommendations are meant to prevent only immediate acute
problems.

Widespread accidents or poisoning in the workplace would at

least inconvenience employers.

If a worker has trained for a certain

position and then poisoned or killed on the job, the company would have
to spend money to train another worker.

But the effects of long-term

exposure to chronic pollution levels generally do not appear until a
worker is close to retirement, thus making it easier for companies to
ignore the problem.

Two excellent examples of this phenomenon are the

results of arsenic and asbestos exposure.

11

The ACGIH arsenic standard was 500 micrograms per cubic meter, the
limit initially adopted by OSHA.

This limit was sufficient to prevent

the acute or immediate effects of arsenic— skin diseases or outright
poisoning.

32

But arsenic is a human carcinogen.

In Montana, for

example, the lung cancer rate is three times the state average among
smelter workers at the Anaconda copper smelter, which processes arsenicladen copper ore.

33

These and similar statistics may illustrate the

magnitude of the problem, but most workers don’t develop cancer for 10
to 30 years after initial exposure.

Another example is pertinent:

In

1974, the Dow Chemical Company revealed that of 178 former workers at
one of its arsenic processing plants, a third had died of cancer.

34

Thus, the relatively long latency period between exposure and development
of cancer probably has little effect, in corporate eyes, on the effi
ciency or productivity of the workforce.
The same is true of asbestos, a fibrous material woven into cloth
used for insulation.

It lodges easily in the lungs and can cause

asbestosis, a debilitating and often fatal lung disease, lung cancer and
mesthelioma, a rare form of lung cancer.

35

The harmful effects of pro

longed asbestos exposure were noticed as early as 1918, when U.S. and
Canadian insurance companies decided to stop selling life insurance to
asbestos workers.

36

A study released by the U.S. Public Health Service

in 1935 found that 67 of 126 who had worked in asbestos plants and mines
had asbestosis.

37

By 1960, 63 papers had been published on the health implications of
asbestosis in the U.S., Canada and Britain.

Fifty-three of these papers

were done by non-industry consultants, and these found a definite

12

correlation between asbestos and asbestosis and lung cancer.

The 11

industry-sponsored papers rejected any connection between asbestos and
lung cancer and minimized asbestosis.^®

During the 1960s, Dr. Lester

Cralley, then of the U.S. Public Health Service and later a consultant
for IHF, began studying possible health problems in the asbestos indus
try.

Although his study acknowledged asbestosis, he made no attempt to

determine any correlation with lung cancer or mesthelioma.
It was not until Dr. Irving Selikoff, an epidemiologist at New York
City's Mt. Sinai Hospital, released a study revealing the extremely high
cancer rates among former asbestos workers that the carcinogen potential
of the substance began to be taken seriously.

Selikoff followed up the

histories of 632 asbestos workers listed on union roles in 1943; by 1973,
444 of these had died— 50% more than expected among the white male popu
lation.

The lung cancer rates among the workers were seven times higher

than expected, and Selikoff found 35 cases of mesthelioma.^®

According

to a 1978 report by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
within the next 30 to 35 years, between 58,000 and 75,000 people now
working with asbestosis will die each year from cancer, a figure which
represents 13% to 18% of all cancer deaths expected in the United States
in the future.
Again, it is important to emphasize that most of these deaths will
occur after the workers have retired or are close to retirement.

Thus,

there is no immediate economic incentive for industry to eliminate the
conditions that cause the disease.

It is difficult to prove that the

industry consultants who downplayed the seriousness of these problems
were actually aware of their severity.

Since they seem to have concen-
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trated their studies on active workers rather than retired workers, they
may not have noticed the extremely high cancer rates among those exposed.
Whatever their motives may have been, the influence of industry
safety and health consultants should not be underestimated.

Although it

might be said that they were formed to fill a gap in workplace health
issues ignored by the government, their conservative impact is still
being felt.

As late as 1968, an editorial in the IHF bulletin claimed

that there was no evidence supporting the existence of black lung.

The

editorial advised people to stop talking about it because continuing
discussion would only alarm miners, causing widespread ectogenic disease—
that is, if you/re told to expect symptoms, you'll develop them.
In 1976, IHF published a book called Industrial Environmental Health—
The Worker and the Community.

Contributors included Dr. Lester Cralley.

The book, a review of current epidemiology, lab studies and disease
detection techniques, is straightforward in its attitude.

As Dr. Cralley

states in the introduction:
The time is now approaching when man's greatest environmental
stress may well be that of his own individual creation— his
home. Many of his hobbies are associated with hazards that
would not be tolerated on the job. . . . To make matters
worse, man's insult to himself from smoking, self-medication,
improvident working habits beyond that to which he is accli
mated, overeating, etc. may actually dwarf environmental
stresses on the job and in the community . . . the fact
remains that information is inadequate to state with any
degree of confidence that air pollution has an ill effect
upon health except under acute c o n d i t i o n s . 43
The activities of these health organizations can also be lucrative.
Between 1963 and the early 1970s, the IHF received more than $1.3 million
in grants and contracts from the U.S. Public Health Service.
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The influence of industry consultants did not end with passage of
the OSH Act.

As OSHA and NIOSH began reviewing the literature and doing

epidemiology studies to detect problems and adopt adequate standards,
industry responded with a barrage of studies downplaying the potential
dangers of many workplace chemicals.
At 1973 hearings before the Department of Labor's advisory committee
on health problems associated with pesticides, consultants representing
Shell Oil, Dow Chemical, Du Pont and the Manufacturing Chemists Associ
ation insisted that the pesticides were not carcinogens, but "tumorigens."
Tumorigens, they said, induced only localized benign tumors and had no
connection with malignancy.

Under questioning about potential hazards

of these chemicals in the workplace, both Dow and Du Pont admitted that
they routinely destroyed workers' records after ten years of employment.
A group recently formed to represent industry in workplace issues is
the American Industrial Health Council (AIHC).

Started by the Manufac

turing Chemists Association, the AIHC challenges connections between
industrial pollution and the nationwide increase in cancer rates.

In

1900, cancer caused 4% of all deaths; by 1968, this had increased to
about 20%, the second leading cause of all d e a t h s . A I H C attributes
the increase to increased longevity and personal habits such as cigarette
smoking.

The organization's approach may best be illustrated by a state

ment by one of its consultants before the Labor Department's advisory
committee :
Cancer in its many forms is undoubtedly a natural disease. It
is probably one of nature's many ways of eliminating sexually
effete indivuals who would otherwise, in nature's view, compete
for available resources without advantage to the species as a
whole.47
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It is apparent from the preceding discussion that there have been
severe occupational health problems in the United States.

These problems

generally were ignored for years because they often did not affect
workers until they had retired or were close to retirement, so industry
could afford to ignore them.

But the very severity of the problem

finally convinced Congress that some form of federal regulation was
necessary.

Chapter 2

THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT

Why It Was Passed
Until passage of the OSH Act, there were no concerted workplace
regulations at either the state or federal level.

Although a number of

states had occupational health agencies, they were often understaffed.
In 1969, only 38 states operated occupational health programs, and many
of these were also responsible for air pollution control and radiological
health.^®
inspectors.

Only three states had more than 100 occupational health/safety
In 1968, there were 1,600 state inspectors and 100 federal

inspectors, less than half the number of state and federal fish and game
w a r d e n s . T h e Labor Department estimated in 1969 that total state
expenditures on workplace safety and health were about $23 million or
about 33o per worker.
Although the Department of Health, Education and Welfare included
several agencies responsible for public health, none had power to inspect
workplaces or to enforce standards.

The U.S. Public Health Service, for

example, could inspect workplaces only if invited to do so by the few
states with inspection authority.
The 1935 Walsh-Healey Act, governing the terms of government con
tracts, stipulated that contractors maintain certain safety conditions,
but these were rarely enforced.

In 1969, the Bureau of Labor Statistics

inspected 5 % of the 75,000 firms covered by the law and reported that only
two firms had lost government contracts because of safety conditions.
16
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The rising number of accidents and deaths In Industry after World
War II began to generate Interest In regulation of workplace hazards.
During the war, there were 20,500 major amputations In all branches of
the military; during the same time, there were 65,000 amputations as the
result of Industrial accidents.

More than 25,000 people were killed In

the Korean War, compared with 48,750 deaths on the job during the same
three-year period.
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Interestingly, nuclear power facilities were the first Industry to
be regulated; under the 1954 Atomic Energy Act, standards were established
limiting workers* radiation exposure.
The ever-lncreaslng number and variety

of Industrial

may have promoted concern about the effects of exposure.

chemicals also

The 1958 edi

tion of Chemical Sources, an annual publication for chemical buyers,
listed 17,000 chemicals; by 1970, It listed 41,000 Industrial chemicals.
With the Improving economic conditions after WWII, unions began
paying more attention to health and safety Issues.

In some cases, locals

would strike to Improve working conditions. In 1952, for

example, mine

and mill workers staged a seven-month strike In California over a
slllcosls-llke disease; although the strike did Improve working condi
tions, It received little attention In the national p r e s s . B y the late
1960s, 65% of collective bargaining agreements contained workplace safety
and health stipulations.^^
In February, 1969, West Virginia coal miners went out on a wildcat
strike after a fire and explosion In a Consolidation Coal mine killed
78 men.
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The strike quickly accelerated to Include demands that miners

suffering from black lung receive workers * compensation.

During the
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height of the strike, 42,000 of the state's 44,000 coal miners marched
on the state capitol demanding compensation provisions.

Their efforts

resulted in passage of the 1969 Mine Health and Safety Act and the 1972
Black Lung Benefits Act.
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The event also spurred Congressional action

on an occupational safety and health act then being considered.
Senator Hubert Humphrey (D-Minn.) introduced the first bill calling
for workplace regulation in 1951, but it went nowhere.
1960s, there were few other such attempts.

Until the

In 1964, a Presidential

Council on occupational safety was convened to discuss non-mining working
conditions, but it recommended no particular legislation.

In 1965, HEW

recommended increased spending to study new health hazards in industry,
but could not obtain f u n d i n g . D u r i n g that same year, a bill was intro
duced in the U.S. House of Representatives to regulate hazardous chemicals outside the nuclear industry, but it also was unsuccessful.
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In 1966, the McNamara-0*Hara Public Service Contract Act was
approved, extending the Walsh-Healey Act to government service suppliers,
and in 1968, President Lyndon Johnson proposed a bill similar to the
OSH Act, but it was unsuccessful.
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In 1969, several similar bills were

introduced in both the House and the Senate, and President Richard Nixon
called for some sort of workplace regulation in his Domestic Programs
and Policies Message to Congress in April.
legislation proposals until August.

There were no Administration
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Nixon and the Republicans wanted a national independent occupational
safety and health board to set and enforce standards.

The Democrats, on

the other hand, wanted an enforcement agency in the Department of Labor.
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The Democrats apparently believed that an agency within the Labor
Department would be less subject to Administration pressures.

How It Was Passed^^
March, 1970— The House Select Subcommittee on Labor begins hearings on
HR 3809, introduced by James O'Hara (D-Mich.).

The bill goes

through seven versions before being released by the subcommittee.
— The Senate begins hearings on S 2193, introduced by Harrison
Williams (D-New Jersey), Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.), Walter Mondale
(D-Minn.) and Ralph Yarborough (D-Texas).
April— The House bill goes before the entire committee.

The Republicans

then introduce a compromise bill setting up an occupational safety
and health court similar to the U.S. Tax Court to adjudicate vio
lations.

After the committee rejects this and several other amend

ments, the Republicans stop attending, and the committee does not
have a quorum.
June— Finally convincing members to attend, the House committee approves
the bill, although only one Republican votes for it.

In an appen

dage to the committee report, 12 of the 15 Republicans on the
committee call the bill totally unacceptable, and six sign a state
ment calling it a "tragedy without equal."

At Republican insistence,

the Rules Committee refuses to give the bill a hearing until after
the summer recess.
September— The Senate version goes before the full Labor Committee,
which approves it toward the end of the month.

Although scheduled

for floor debate, it is postponed at the request of the Republican
minority.
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October— Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.), angered at the
delay, asks for unanimous consent to put aside other pending busi
ness because any additional delay would violate the "tacit under
standing" on procedures made during the original request for post
ponement.

The Senate then agrees to make the bill pending business

after the election recess.
November— The bill passes the Senate on November 16 with a few amendments.
The House version reaches the floor the following week and is passed
on November 24.
December— The House/Senate conference on the bill begins December 8.

It

takes five sessions, some as long as seven hours, to reach a compro
mise.

The conference version is adopted 308-60 in the House and

accepted in the Senate by a vote of 83-3 after 10 minutes of debate.
The Occupational Safety and Health Act, Public Law 91-596, is signed
into law on December 29, 1970, covering 4.1 million businesses and
57 million employees.

What the Bill Does
Although the OSH Act represented a veritable leap forward in regu
lating workplace hazards, it was an issue of some controversy in Congress,
and some of its provisions reflect this.

The law did establish the

Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) with clear enforce
ment powers, but allowed employers a number of appeal routes.
The new law subjected all businesses "affecting interstate commerce"
to any standards promulgated by OSHA and entitled employees to basic
rights to a safe and healthful environment.
to the bill:

As stated in the prologue
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The Congress declares it to be its purpose and policy . . . to
assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the
Nation safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve
our human resources.68
The Secretary of Labor is empowered to adopt consensus standards
like ANSI's and/or to promulgate new standards based on "research, demon
strations, experiments, and other such information as may be appropriate."^^
The law specifically states that these standards will assure "to the
extent feasible on the basis of the best available evidence, that no
employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity
even if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by
such standard for the period of his working life."^®
The law also established the National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health (NIOSH) in the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare to provide the research and recommendations needed by OSHA to set
standards.

The setup seems designed to insure an almost adversary posi

tion between the two agencies, limiting the influence of any particular
Administration on regulation as a whole.
NIOSH is mandated to publish an annual list of all toxic industrial
substances and their known toxicity l e v e l s . T h e agency may also
inspect workplaces as needed to establish the extent of hazards and is
required to give inspection results to both the employer and employees.
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OSHA is empowered to inspect workplaces and to issue citations and
fines on the basis of its inspections.

Although OSHA may set its own

inspection priorities, the law appears to emphasize certain situations.
Any employee or employee representative who believes that a violation
exists and that that violation threatens physical harm may request an
OSHA inspection.

OSHA must submit a copy of the request to the employer.
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but the employee can stipulate that his/her name not appear on that
copy.
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Representatives of both the employer and employees may accompany

an inspector.
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The penalties for violations are relatively low, reflecting
Congressional intent to avoid intimidating employers :
— Serious violations:
per violation.

A mandatory civil penalty of up to $1,000

— Non-serious violations: At OSHA’s discretion, a civil penalty
of up to $1,000 per violation.
— Repeated violations:
per violation.

A mandatory civil penalty of up to $10,000

— Failure to correct a violation within a specified period: A
mandatory civil penalty of no more than $1,000 each day the
violation remains uncorrected.
— Willful violation that results in death: After conviction, a
criminal penalty of not more than $10,000 and imprisonment of
not more than six months.*
Employers are subject to these fines if they violate any OSHA
standards or if they violate Section 5 of the law which states that:
"Each employer shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a
place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are
causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his
employees."

Called the "general duty" clause, this provision is often

used by OSHA inspectors in situations, generally involving safety not
health, that are not covered by standards.

An OSHA inspector gave the

example of a propane business where an inspection revealed gas leaking

*It is probably a comfort to the more nervous employers that the law
also stipulates that any inspector "who kills a person while engaged in
or on the account of the performance of investigative, inspection or law
enforcement functions" shall be subject to criminal prosecution.
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from tanks.

There Is no standard for leaking propane tanks, so the

inspector cited the violation as a "recognized hazard" under the general
duty clause.
If an inspector believes an imminent danger situation exists, that
is, a situation which endangers employees* lives, he/she may seek an
injunction from a U.S. district court.

This was provided for situations

so serious that action is needed immediately.

The court may issue a

temporary restraining order pending the outcome of enforcement proceed
ings.

In an earlier draft of the law, inspectors would have been

allowed to issue a closing order 72 hours before the case was tested in
court.
Imminent danger cases are rare.

There has been only one attempt in

recent years to get a "cease and desist" injunction in OSHA* s Region 8,
which includes Montana.*

Inspectors sought an injunction against the

owner of a plant whose employees were exposed to potentially dangerous
ammonia levels.

However, the plant exploded, killing the owner, before

the injunction was granted.
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An employer can contest a citation by filing notice with the Occupa
tional Health and Safety Review Commission within 15 working days.

The

Commission is an independent adjudication board, with six members

*There are ten OSHA regional offices: (1) Connecticut, Maine,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont; (2) New York, New
Jersey, Puerto Rico; (3) Delaware, District of Columbia, Maryland,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia; (4) Alabama, Florida, Georgia,
Kentucky, Mississippi, North and South Carolina, Tennessee; (5) Illinois,
Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Wisconsin; (6) Arkansas, Louisiana,
New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas; (7) Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska;
(8) Colorado, Montana, North and South Dakota, Utah, Wyoming; (9) Arizona,
California, Hawaii, Nevada; (10) Alaska, Idaho, Oregon, Washington.
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appointed by the President for six-year terms.
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The Commission assigns

a judge and a docket number to the case.
The appeals process can be quite lengthy.

According to Jerry

Atencio, a Region 8 OSHA lawyer, it may take three to six months to
schedule a hearing, depending on a judge's case load.

After receiving

the notice of contest from the employer, usually in the form of a legal
brief, OSHA has 20 working days to respond.

The judge then sets a

schedule, and the hearing is generally held within two months.

After

the hearing, all parties may take 20 days to file post-hearing briefs,
longer if the case is complex.

After the judge receives the briefs,

he/she begins writing the decision, which may take from 15 days to three
months.

The judge files the decision with the Review Commission, which

may accept the findings or order a Commission hearing of the case.
If the judge rules against the employer, he or she may appeal the
case to a federal court of appeals.

It is unlikely that the court would

rule against the government at this point in the appeals process.
Atencio explained:

As

"The higher up in the appellate system you go, the

more likely that you'll get a ruling in favor of administrative discretion."
An employer may also appeal a Review Commission decision in an
appeals court.

Because administrative channels have been exhausted at

this point, Atencio said, the court may be more lenient.
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States can develop their own plans to enforce occupational safety
and health standards.

This section of the OSH Act may represent a com

promise with the Republican minority which opposed federal regulation.
When submitting their plans, the states must prove that they will be at
least as effective as the federal government's, with adequate financing
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and standards and enforcement authority.

QO

Until 1973, any state that
QO

wished to submit a state plan could apply for a federal grant to do so.
The Labor Department would pay up to 90% of the cost to develop the plan
QA

and up to 50% of the cost of operating approved state plans.
Concerned about the lack of reliable injury/illness statistics.
Congress also included a provision called for a program to "develop and
maintain an effective program of collection, compilation and analysis of
occupational safety and health statistics."
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The Labor Department may

make grants of up to 50% of total costs to collect such statistics.
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Employers are also required to keep records for OSHA on work-related
injuries, illnesses and deaths.
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The act established that employers have specific duties to their
employees.

They must keep records of employee exposure to potentially

dangerous workplace pollutants, and employees must have access to these
records.

Employers must "promptly" notify any employee who is exposed to

levels exceeding OSHA standards.
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Any OSHA pollution standard must

include labeling requirements so that employees can know Where they are

exposed in the workplace, what the symptoms of excessive exposure are
and instructions for safe use.

The standards may also require employers

to pay for employees* medical exams.
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Any employer who violates the

posting requirements may be fined up to $1,000 for each violation.

Chapter 3

WORKPLACE REGULATION AFTER THE OSH ACT

Setting Standards
OSHA and NIOSH began their activities during a Republican Adminis
tration somewhat ambivalent about workplace regulation.

OSHA initially

reflected this reluctance and promulgated few new health standards in its
early years.

Even after the agency began to take a more aggressive

stance in the middle 1970s on workplace pollutants, particularly those
suspected of causing cancer, industry challenges of new standards appear
to be successfully hampering OSHA*s ability to promulgate strict pollu
tion controls.
OSHA and NIOSH faced tremendous problems when they first began
operating.

Testimony during Congressional hearings on the OSH Act

revealed that there were only 700 occupational health specialists in the
country, and the American Medical Association noted that 5,000 full- or
part-time physicians and 10,000 nurses would be needed to deal with work
place safety and h e a l t h . A 1967 report by the U.S. Surgeon General's
office showed that 65% of the workers in the 1,700 plants surveyed were
exposed to toxic agents, and only 25% of the workers were adequately
protected.
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OSHA immediately adopted 4,400 standards, roughly 45% from ANSI and
ACGIH; the rest existed already under the Walsh-Healey Act, the Construc
tion Safety Act and the Longshoring Safety Act.
health standards.
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About 400 of these were

As mentioned, most of these health standards
26
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protected workers only from outright poisoning and did not include
consideration of long-term effects.
OSHA can promulgate new standards to replace these interim standards,
but the process is lengthy, sometimes taking more than a year.

First,

NIOSH must issue a criteria document— a survey of the available literature
on the health effects of the substance being considered.

NIOSH may also

grant contracts to outside consultants to do parts of the criteria docu
ment.

Because the industrial health field has been dominated by industry,

many of the consultants initially hired by the agency had close industry
ties, and their recommendations sometimes reflected this.
In 1972, NIOSH gave a contract to Clayton and Associates to develop
criteria to regulate benzene, which is known to induce anemia and/or
leukemia.

Clayton formed an advisory committee for the project whose

members included the chief of Shell Oil's industrial hygiene department,
the former chief toxicologist for ESSO Research and Engineering Company
and representatives from the Manufacturing Chemists Association and the
American Steel Institute.

Clayton later proposed a benzene standard 2h

times higher than that proposed by both ANSI and the International Labor
Organization, an informal affiliate of the United Nations.

Only after

the AFL-CIO Industrial Union Department submitted a formal complaint to
NIOSH did Clayton recommend a stricter standard.
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After NIOSH releases the criteria document, OSHA convenes an advi
sory committee with representatives from government, industry, labor and
the medical profession to determine an appropriate exposure level.

In

reviewing NIOSH*s recommendations and OSHA's standards, this author has
noticed that OSHA seldom adopts a standard as strict as that proposed by
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NIOSH.

The Labor Department usually considers the availability and costs

of different compliance methods and the feasibility of various exposure
limits.

For example, theoretically there should be no exposure to a

known carcinogen, such as benzene and arsenic, but unless a substance is
banned, OSHA must set some exposure limitation.
After the advisory committee recommends a standard, the Labor
Department must publish the standard in the Federal Register within 60
days.

After publication, there is a 30-day period for written comments.

Those who believe that they will be adversely affected by the standard
may petition for review in a federal court of appeals within 60 days
after the standard is promulgated.
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Often, those challenging a standard

will also seek an injunction against enforcement of it.

Currently, three

standards are at least partially stayed— benzene, lead and arsenic.
By the end of 1974, OSHA had promulgated only four major standards,
regulating mechanical power presses, asbestos, a package of 14 carcino
gens and vinyl c h l o r i d e . T h e primary problem faced by OSHA, and to
some extent NIOSH, was that its first six years were under two consecu
tive conservative Administrations.

The very lack of workplace regulation

before OSHA made the new standards and enforcement of them an almost
radical issue.

Many businessmen saw the OSH Act as yet another federal

attempt to limit free enterprise.

In 1972 alone, the Montana Congres

sional delegation received 500 letters complaining about OSHA inspections.
But the state AFL-CIO reported that there had been only 91 inspections
in Montana during that year.
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The Nixon Administration used the furor over OSHA to political
advantage.

Watergate investigators found a memo from George Guenther,
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the first Nixon-appointed OSHA administrator, stating that the agency
would table action on "highly controversial standards" during the 1972
Presidential campaign.

The memo also suggested that fund raisers should

stress the advantages of four more years of weakened OSHA enforcement
under a Republican Administration.
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In 1973, rumors abounded that the Nixon Administration wanted to
merge HEW and the Labor Department to create a more manageable agency.
Although this never materialized, NIOSH was transferred from HEW*s
Health Services and Mental Health Administration to the Center for
Disease Control, losing both direct access to the Secretary of HEW and
50 of its 650 employees.
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During the Ford Administration, OSHA proposed a cotton dust standard
of 200 micrograms per cubic meter to protect textile workers from byssinosis or "brown lung."

The agency revised the standard to 500 micrograms

after industry protests that compliance costs would total $2.7 billion.
In April, 1976, the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic
Workers asked Secretary of Labor William Usery to issue an emergency
benzene standard, authorized if workers are "exposed to grave danger
from exposure to substances or agents determined to be toxic or physi
cally h a r m f u l . U s e r y denied the union's request in May.
According to a study by the U.S. General Accounting Office, OSHA
concentrated on safety rather than health issues during its first five
years.

Of the 2,271 inspection records GAO reviewed, only 26% mentioned

high risk substances, and 12 of the regulated carcinogens were not
mentioned at all.
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After President Jimmy Carter took office in 1977, OSHA began to
take a more aggressive stance on workplace health issues.

The agency's

apparent reluctance to promulgate new standards was beginning to attract
criticism.

The consensus standards setting organizations themselves had

revised some of their standards on the basis of new sci^tific evidence.
For exan^le, the ACGIH standard for cadmium, a lethal trace element, is
now .05 mg/m^; OSHA's is .1 mg, the value adopted in 1971.

ACGIH's

standard for malathion, a pesticide and suspected carcinogen is 10 mg;
OSHA's is 15 mg.^°^
Carter-appointed OSHA administrator Eula Bingham announced in June,
1977, that the agency would concentrate on serious health hazards,
stating that "That means cutting out the Mickey Mouse and focusing on
the truly hazardous situations that make people sick and die."

Bingham

also announced an emergency standard for Benzene, lowering allowable
levels from 10 ppm to 1 ppm.
As part of an attempt to curb industry criticism, OSHA also elimi
nated 1,000 "nit-picking" standards, such as rules telling employers how
to select toilet seats.
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The agency began to promulgate standards more rapidly.

A permanent

benzene standard was promulgated in late 1977, and both the lead and
arsenic standards were announced in 1978.
However, OSHA immediately ran into challenges focusing on the cost
of compliance with its new standards.

In a continuation of the cotton

dust controversy, the President's Council on Economic Affairs asked the
agency to prepare a less costly alternative to the 500 microgram standard.
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Bingham threatened to r e s i g n . T h e Administration backed off, and
OSHA promulgated the standard in June, 1978.
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But the main challenge of OSHA's standards is that the agency
refuses to do a traditional cost/benefit analysis.

Although it does

submit an Economic Impact Statement describing the costs of a standard
and its probable impact on affected industries, it does not explain in
detail the future benefits of the standard, arguing that many of the
health effects are unknown.

In its economic justification OSHA simply

cites probable future benefits.

When defending the lead standard, for

example, the director of OSHA health standards said that 10,000 cases of
kidney disease requiring dialysis were directly attributable to excessive
lead exposure and noted that dialysis costs $50,000 per patient annually.
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When OSHA first began promulgating standards, and ending up in court
defending them, the courts by-and-large granted the agency a fair amount
of administrative discretion.

In 1974, the D.C. Court of Appeals ruled

against the AFL-CIO, which had challenged OSHA's decision to allow
asbestos industries a certain number of years to comply with the standard.
The court noted that:
. . . some of the questions involved in the promulgation of
these standards are on the frontiers of scientific knowledge,
and consequently, insufficient data is presently available to
make a fully informed factual decision. Decision making in
that circumstance depends to a greater extent on policy judg
ments and less upon purely factual analysis.HO
The court noted that there was little information about the effects
of various asbestos levels, but that the Secretary of Labor must be able
to establish some permissible level.

When examining the term "feasible,"

the court said that the act was not intended to justify "immediate impie-
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mentation of all protective measures technologically feasible without
regard for their economic impact.
But the court obviously did not believe that the promulgation process
must be subject to a rigid cost/benefit analysis.

It noted that there

could be some inevitable closures among individual employers who lagged
behind the rest of the industry technologically and therefore could not
cope with pollution control requirements.

The court stated that OSHA

could consider the ability of the entire industry to compete in the
market, but that "These tentative examples are not offered to illustrate
concrete examples of economic unfeasibility, but rather to suggest the
complex elements that may be relevant to such a determination."
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In March, 1975, OSHA won another victory when the Second Circuit
Court upheld the vinyl chloride standard, stating that it was proper to
set a low exposure limit when it was clear that the chemical was hazard
ous, but there was no conclusive evidence supporting any particular level
as safe.

The court rejected attacks on the standard's feasibility,

holding that the Secretary of Labor may set a standard which forces the
development of new technology.

The consortium of plastic and chemical

companies challenging the standard appealed the decision, but the Supreme
Court denied

review.
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In 1978, the Third Circuit dismissed a challenge by the American
Iron and Steel Institute of the coke oven standard, which regulates
hydrocarbon emissions.

The court's ruling established that:

(1) OSHA's

determination that coke oven standards are carcinogenic was supported by
substantial evidence, and (2) the plaintiffs had been unable to prove
that the standard imperiled the steel industry's existence.

The court
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accepted the need for
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cost/benefit evaluation, but Implicitly denied

the need for justification of precise future benefit:
Although we are very sensitive to the financial implications
of the standard and have endeavored to carefully weigh its
effects upon the well-being of the industry, we are not per
suaded that its implementation would precipitate anything
approaching the "massive dislocation" which would character
ize an economically infeasible standard.114
During that same year came the decision in the Fifth Circuit Court,
which has been notably hostile to OSHA, granting an injunction against
the benzene standard because the agency did not specify the value of
expected benefits.

OSHA reduced allowable levels to 1 ppm because the

chemical is a carcinogen and because 600,000 workers in 150,000 workplaced are exposed to it.^^^
The standard was challenged by the American Petroleum Institute,
which argued that OSHA had failed to show that the standard fulfilled
the requirements of Section 3(8).

This section states that a standard

"requires conditions, or the adoption of use of one or more practices,
means, methods, operations, or processes, reasonably necessary or appro
priate to provide safe and healthful employment . . . " (emphasis added).
The term "reasonably necessary," the Institute insisted, meant that OSHA
would have to show that the expected benefits of the standard exceeded
the costs.
The Fifth Circuit agreed.

OSHA had assessed compliance costs of

the standard— $187 to $205 million first-year operating costs, $266
million in engineering controls, and $34 million recurring annual costs—
deciding that the standard was feasible because it didn't threaten the
welfare of the affected firms or the economy in general.

The agency
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flatly refused to provide detailed estimates of future benefits, stating
simply that benefits "may be appreciable" because benzene is a proven
carcinogen at current exposure levels.
The Fifth Circuit ruled that OSHA did not have the authority "to
create absolutely risk-free workplaces regardless of cost" and that the
agency must determine whether the benefits expected from the standard
bear a reasonable relationship to the costs imposed.

The only way, the

court said, to tell whether the relationship between costs and benefits
is reasonable is to outline both.

Rejecting OSHA’s argument that it can

be assumed that lower levels of a known carcinogen are beneficial, the
court said " . . . mere rationality is not equivalent to substantial evidence that conditions required by the standard are reasonably necessary."
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In an interesting twist of logic, the court ruled that although OSHA
did not have to wait for a pattern of excess cancer deaths to lower a
standard, a lack of information on the effects of lower exposure limits
could not be used to justify a standard.

The court suggested that labora

tory animal experiments or extrapolation of deaths caused by higher
exposure levels be used.

The court also specifically refused to reconcile

its decision with the vinyl chloride, asbestos and coke oven emission
standards upheld by other circuit courts, stating that these decisions
did not address Congressional intent.
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OSHA appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, with the AFL-CIO
as an intervenor.

Arguments were heard in early 1980, but the Court did

not rule on the case until July 2, 1980, and its decision was by no means
clearcut.

The Court was split 5 to 4, with Chief Justice Burger and

Justices Stevens, Stewart, Powell and Rehnquist upholding the Fifth
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Circuit ruling, and Justices Marshall, Brennan, White and Blackman
dissenting.

Even the majority could not agree on all of the issues, and

while concurring with the majority decision. Justices Burger, Powell and
Rehnquist all wrote separate opinions.
The Court did not address the need for a cost/benefit analysis of
the OSHA standard, instead ruling that a standard is not "reasonably
necessary and appropriate" unless OSHA can prove that exposure to levels
above the proposed standard pose a significant risk.

The Court said

that OSHA had not proved that benzene concentrations above 1 ppm repre
sented a clear threat to workers' health:
'Safe' is not the equivalent of 'risk-free.' . . . a workplace
can hardly be considered 'unsafe' unless it threatens the work
ers with a significant risk of harm. Therefore, before he can
promulgate any permanent health or safety standard, the Secre
tary (of Labor) is required to make a threshold finding that a
place of employment is unsafe— in the sense that significant
risks are present and can be eliminated or lessened by a change
in practices.120
The Court flatly refused to rule on the need for a cost/benefit
evaluation until OSHA could establish that the standard would protect
workers from a significant risk.

However, the majority's decision indi

cates de facto support for such a requirement:

The Court noted that

because gas station employees are not covered by the benzene standard,
only 35,000 workers would be affected and compliance costs would be
about $82,000 per worker.
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The minority opinion, written by Justice Marshall, chastised the
majority for what it called a flagrant disregard for traditional restric
tions on judicial authority.

The dissenters stated that in cases where

scientific evidence could not establish a clear level at which damage to
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health would not occur, OSHA had a Congressional mandate to set standards
on the basis of the best available evidence, even If that evidence Is
InconclusIve:
Nothing In the Act purports to prevent the Secretary from
acting when definitive Information as to the quantity of a
standard's benefits Is unavailable. Where, as here, the defi
ciency In knowledge relates to the extent of the benefits
rather than their existence, I see no reason to hold that the
Secretary has exceeded his statutory a u t h o r i t y . 122
The benzene case was expected to set a precedent for OSHA's ability
to set occupational health standards.

However, the ruling appears ambi

valent at best, and It Is probable that future court cases will decide
the Issue.
OSHA had not Ignored cost/benefit considerations before the benzene
case.

The agency was fairly careful to consider the costs and Industry

wide effects of standard compliance, and, on occasion, was willing to
limit engineering controls, particularly In safety issues. This is
apparent In OSHA's attempts to control workplace noise.
for noise Is 90 decibels, eight-hour average.

The standard

In 1972, NIOSH proposed

an eight-hour standard of 85 dBA.

A level of 85 dBA has half the energy

and sounds 75% as loud as 90 dBA.

According to an OSHA study, the com

pliance costs of NIOSH's proposed standard would have been between $13.5
billion and $31.6 billion, and OSHA decided to leave the standard
unchanged, but required more Intensive monitoring of noise levels and
workers' hearing losses.
The Review Commission has also ruled In favor of proven cost
effectiveness of engineering controls, often requiring a feasibility
(cost/benefit) test.

One example Is a Montana case In which the
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Hoemer Waldorf pulp and paper mill appealed citations alleging exces
sive noise levels and a lack of engineering or administrative controls
(administrative controls include moving workers who are "overexposed" to
pollution or noise).

Although the Commission noted that the company's

industrial hygenist seemed to have made no attempt to assess the feasi
bility of various control techniques and that "his approach was diffident
and carefully hedged," it agreed with the company's contention that OSHA
must prove engineering feasibility:

"When failure to use engineering

controls is charged, complainant must establish that such methods exist
and that their utilization would be reasonably expected to produce a
significant result.
In a March, 1979, ruling, the Sixth Circuit Court reiterated this
view and noted that "A consensus is developing among the circuits (courts)
that the term (feasibility) should encompass both technological and
economic feasibility."
noise controls.

The case involved a company appealing engineering

The company did not contest the noise levels cited by

OSHA, and OSHA did not contest the company's contention that ear muffs
reduced noise levels to acceptable limits, but demanded engineering
controls.

The court cited a Review Commission decision in which the

Commission ruled that controls can be required even if they are expensive
and increase production costs, "But they will not be required without
regard to the costs which must be incurred and the benefits they will
achieve.

In determining whether controls are economically feasible, all

the relevant cost and benefit factors must be weighed."

The court stated

that the fact that an employer can afford controls cannot be used as a
standard's sole justification.
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Recent court decisions upholding cost/benefit requirements may
severely constrain OSHA’s ability to regulate workplace health hazards in
the future.

The ability of an agency responsible for the health and

safety of more than 60 million workers to conduct extensive economic
studies for each standard it promulgates is doubtful, especially since,
according to the General Accounting Office, "At the current rate of
standards development, it may take 100 years or more to develop needed
health standards.
Calculating the possible benefits of pollution reduction is a rela
tively new art and subject to widely differing estimates.

A study done

for the Council on Environmental Quality reported that estimates of the
health benefits of controlling air pollution from stationary sources
ranged from $1.8 billion to $14.4 billion.
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Traditional cost/benefit analyses use a combination of economic
predictions and policy decisions.

For example, government decision

makets considering approval of a proposed power plant will look at the
need for the power, the possible environmental effects, the cost of the
facility and public support for the project.

If the project is to be

economically feasible, expected benefits must exceed the initial invest
ment and future maintenance costs.

The system depends on the ability of

decision makers to anticipate total costs and total benefits, and both
can be difficult.

Initial analysis of a power plant’s future detriments

may overstate costs because of future technology that could allow pollu
tion control equipment to increase production efficiency or use waste for
other commercial products.

Conversely, benefits may be exaggerated:

Coal mining associated with the power plant could pollute local ground-
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water, damaging agricultural production, or the plant'spollution could
cause long-term unexpected damage to plants and animals.
The ability of unanticipated effects to greatly increase the future
costs of a project is becoming more apparent in a society which is only
now feeling the effects of decisions made decades ago.
pertinent example is the Love Canal tragedy.

À recent and

The Hooker Chemical Company

used the canal in Niagara Falls as a chemical dump for several years
after World War II.

In 1953, the company sold the canal to the city,

which later constructed a school on the site.

In 1979, residents were

first told that the area was contaminated by toxic wastes and later told
that tests showed several people had chromosome damage, all the result of
decisions made a quarter of a century ago.
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It is the unknown future costs of current exposure that OSHA seems
trying to avoid by setting limits that it apparently cannot justify using
traditional cost/benefit analyses.

The agency's stance is that little is

understood about the long-term response to many chemicals now in use.
The benzene standard, for example, was promulgated in response to disease
rates among workers exposed in the 1940s.

According to a 1978 HEW report,

the incidence of cancer attributable to occupational exposure to all
industrial chemicals is at least 20%.
cancer ranged from 1% to 10%.

Previous estimates of work-related
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Thus, neither OSHA nor NIOSH can predict the exact benefits of
limiting exposure to many suspected carcinogens; it is nearly impossible
given the state of present medical knowledge and the plethora of new
chemicals being introduced into industrial processes.

NIOSH has compiled

a list of 28,000 toxic chemicals, 2,200 of them suspected carcinogens.
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Recently, there have been a few attempts to calculate the future
health consequences of present pollution exposure.

The National Academy

of Sciences, for example, suggests using a probability theory.

To use its

example, pesticides, it could be decided that there was a 90% chance that
pesticides would cause no additional deaths, a 5% chance that exposure
would cause 10 deaths, and 5% that it would cause 100 deaths, thus
resulting in the formula:
of 5.5 excess deaths.

. 9 x 0 + .05 x 10 + .05 x 100 = a probability

A value could then be assigned to each excess

death and compared with the economic loss of banning the chemical.
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Again, this method assumes sufficient medical knowledge to assign a
probability to the effects of any given chemical.
Even future costs can be difficult to determine.

Industries which

may have to install control equipment because of an environmental
standard may exaggerate the probable expense.

The Kennecott Copper

Company, for example, replaced the furnace system in one of its smelters

with a modem, less polluting system and claimed that its pollution
abatement costs were $280 million.

But a study by the Stanford Research

Institute reported that actual controls cost only $88 million.
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Ironically, both the federal and Montana ambient air quality laws

stipulate, or have been interpreted to stipulate, that standards set to
protect human health should not be subject to economic considerations.
The federal law calls for primary air quality standards which "are
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requisite to protect the public health" (emphasis added).

Although

the law also contains provisions for advisory committees on proposed
standards to consider health, social and economic effects, Ken Alchema
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of the Environmental Protection Agency said that the agency assumes that
human health concerns need not be balanced against costs.
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The Montana Clean Air Act statement of policy and purpose requires
the state to:

"achieve and maintain such levels of air quality as will

protect human health and safety and, to the greatest degree practicable,
prevent injury to plant and animal life and property . . .

According

to Frank Crowley, a lawyer for the state Department of Health, state
standards to protect human health are not subject, at least theoretically,
to cost/benefit questions.*
Both federal and state air quality laws allow much lower levels than
workplace standards.

For example, the Montana standard for total sus

pended particulate is 160 micrograms per cubic meter (24-hour average).
The particulate standard in the workplace, not including silica or coal
dust, is 15,000 micrograms.

By comparison, the particulate crisis level

in Missoula County is 625 micrograms, and the highest level reached in
Missoula after the May 18, 1980, eruption of Mt. Saint Helens was 19,228
micrograms.
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Yet OSHA may not be able to require controls to reach

even these levels if current court decisions stand.

Enforcement
The authority to inspect workplaces is the key to OSHA’s enforcement
powers.

Before 1971, the government could not inspect most workplaces or

*Not everyone agrees with this interpretation. In June, 1980, the
legislature's Administrative Code Committee ordered the Department of
Health to conduct an economic impact study of the state's new air quality
standards. Although the state Board of Health, which must approve the
standards, has decided not to require the study, the issue may well end
up in court.
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enforce standards.

The OSH Act allowed the government for the first time

to require industry to provide healthful working environments.

It

appears, however, that at least until recently, OSHA inspections have
not focused on the most severe workplace hazards, those affecting
workers * health.
In 1972, OSHA made 36,100 inspections, for a total of 125,000 vio
lations and a proposed $3,121,000 in fines.
per violation.

This is an average of $25

More than half of the inspections were done at employee

request; of these, 65% involved safety conditions and 35% involved health.
In 1975, OSHA conducted 88,781 inspections.

There are no data on

the percentage of health versus safety inspection, but it is significant
that only 2.5% of the citations were for serious violations.

The average

fine was $112.^^^
OSHA*s initial approach to workplace hazards was cautious.

In 1971,

the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers (OCAW) union requested an imminent
danger inspection at a New Jersey Mobil refinery where workers were
exposed to asbestos, sulfuric acid, benzene, hydrogen sulfide and other
hazardous substances.

The union asked Dr. Selikoff to examine the

workers, and he found several cases of lung abnormalities suggesting the
onset of asbestosis.
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OSHA did not respond to the request for two weeks.

During the 28-

day inspection, the inspectors presented management with a schedule of
areas they wished to visit each day, giving the company time to clean up
or move people out of dangerous areas.

OSHA cited 354 violations, only

12 of them involving health, and fined the company $7,300.

Although the

agency concentrated on safety rather than health conditions, two workers
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were killed in a fire and explosion at the refinery in May, 1972.

OSHA

fined the company $1,215 for the two deaths.
NIOSH also sometimes showed the same cautious attitude.

In 1972,

two NIOSH hygenists wrote to their associate director about some severe
health problems they suspected were associated with beryllium levels in
a Pennsylvania plant, and they suggested more inspections.

The reply

was in the form of a policy memorandum:
It is not the intent, nor the policy, of NIOSH to convey to
the outside world that our role under the OSHA of 1970 is one
having authority for enforcement. Rather, we must present an
image more in keeping with that of a research agency.141
It is perhaps unfair to criticize the performance of two fledgling
agencies under a conservative Administration.
inspectors ;

In 1971, there were 456

in 1977, there were 2,849, still a small number consider

ing the size of the workforce— more than 60 million w o r k e r s . N I O S H * s
1974 appropriation was $28 m i l l i o n , c o m p a r e d with almost $50 million
in 1977.145
It is also likely that many of the people working for OSHA and NIOSH
in their early years may have been frustrated by industry opposition and
the lack of Administration support.

As Dr. William M. Johnson, a NIOSH

hygenist in the early 1970s and now an associate professor in environ
mental health at the University of Washington, put it:
. . . I*m afraid of becoming frustrated and fatigued in this
field and of becoming part of the fabric of how things are done
in a large bureaucracy. You see, the way things are set up in
occupational health these days, it’s all too easy for a man to
look at the welter of problems waiting solution, to realize the
lack of any intention on the part of many people in govemmait
and industry to take any significant action to remedy them and
to say to himself, "Well, I can’t do anything on ray own, so I
might as well sit back and fit into the w o r l d . "146
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It is perhaps OSHA*s "schizophrenic” approach to inspection prior
ities that has garnered the most criticism.

Although the agency suppos

edly assigned top priority to hazardous industries, the 1975 President’s
Report on Occupational Safety and Health showed that 21% of the inspections resulted in no citations and 56% in no penalties.
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For an agency

under fire for nit-picking standards and needless harassment of business,
this indicates an approach almost guaranteed to further anger businessmen
without really addressing the more severe workplace hazards.
OSHA’s most severe critic, outside of organized labor, has been the
General Accounting Office (GAO). The GAO has issued at least six reports
on workplace regulation, and all focus either on a lack of agency direc
tion or poor use of its own authority.
GAO noted that OSHA has concentrated on safety issues.

In a review

of 2,271 inspection records, the GAO reported that high-risk substances
were mentioned in only 26%, and 12 of the 16 carcinogens were not men
tioned at all.
Reporting

Fifty percent of the files did not mention health hazards.

irately that OSHA and state hygenists had inspected less than

1% of the nation’s workplaces by 1977, the GAO stated that OSHA makes
little use of data already available.

The carcinogen standards require

employers using or producing such substances to report their location and
the number of people employed to the nearest OSHA area office.

OSHA

officials told the GAO that they had not gathered copies of these reports
in the national office and did not know how many employers had sent in
such reports.
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The GAO was also critical of NIOSH.

Under its Health Hazard

Evaluation Program, NIOSH can respond to employer/employee requests to
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determine whether there are harmful substances in the workplace.

Between

1971 and 1977, the agency had received only 892 requests and completed
only 380 evaluations.

About half of these found exposure of potentially

harmful levels of various pollutants.
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GAO complained that NIOSH made little attempt to publicize the
evaluation service; NIOSH argued that although it contacts unions,
industry and professional groups, it doesn't want the extra workload
widespread publicity would bring.

But the GAO insisted that:

We believe the program should be made known to all employers
and employees— not just those who belong to unions or industry
groups or who employ industrial hygenists. While the program
has been promulgated in the Federal Register, we doubt if most
workers or employers are aware of the Federal R e g i s t e r . 150
The GAO study also found that only half of the 65 health evaluations
it surveyed included medical examinations and that NIOSH rarely if ever
conducted followup i n s p e c t i o n s . A c c o r d i n g to Bobby Gunter, a NIOSH
hygenist responsible for the evaluation program in OSHA Regions 8, 9 and
10, the agency never does followup inspections unless contacted by an
employer or employee.

He also said that medical exams were conducted

only if it was apparent that health problems existed.

Citing NIOSH's

December, 1978, evaluation of the Stauffer Chemical Company near Butte,
Gunter said that the company had an adequate medical program and a very
good respirator program, including weekly visits by a dentist to check
for phossy jaw, a degenerative bone disease caused by exposure to elemen
tal phosphorus.

Because of this, NIOSH did not do any medical exams at

_
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the plant.
However, a review of NIOSH's evaluation report on Stauffer shows
that workers were exposed to phosphorus pentoxide levels above the OSHA
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standard of 1,000 mlcrograms, although elemental phosphorus levels were
below applicable standards.

The evaluation report included a footnote

below each table of pollution levels which exceeded standards noting
153
that "workers wore respirators when working in contaminated air."

The

respirator program may have been the result of an earlier OSHA inspection
and resulting fine of $2,240 for inadequate ventilation and lack of
respirators.
Gunter said most of the evaluation requests he receives are from
management.

He said that NIOSH evaluations essentially provided a free

consulting service for employers, providing information about possible
violations and how to correct them, thus saving thousands of dollars in
consulting fees.
The NIOSH health hazard evaluations are a valuable source of infor
mation about the kind and extent of workplace health problems.

The NIOSH

hygenists sometimes are able to detect potential health problems which
might be passed over by OSHA inspectors, whose training is more often in
engineering.

Although NIOSH does send its evaluation reports to OSHA, it

does not combine reports on similar industries, a practice which could
provide industry-wide epidemiology studies.
Another major problem with the NIOSH evaluations is that the agency
does not inform workers about changes in health standards.

For example,

NIOSH told workers exposed to benzene that workplace levels did not
exceed the 10 ppm standard.

OSHA later reduced allowable benzene levels

to 1 ppm, but NIOSH did not tell the workers that the standard had
changed or that they were exposed to benzene above that level.
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Interestingly, despite the GAO’s contention in several reports that
both OSHA and NIOSH often did not respond adequately to potential work
place hazards or to workers* right to information about these hazards, it
was critical of OSHA*s tendency to respond to most worker requests for
inspections.

In a review of 267 employee complaint inspections, the GAO

said that only 65 were from high-risk industries.

Almost 70% of the

complaints involved non-serious violations and only 1% involved imminent
danger situations.
Harry Hutton, the OSHA area office director in Billings, said that
because of this type of criticism and a move to put more emphasis on
problem industries, OSHA is putting less emphasis on worker inspection
requests.

He said that his office usually responded to formal union

requests.

If, however, a request comes from an individual employee, OSHA

often responds by informing the employer about the violation, without
identifying the employee.

The office then informs the employee that the

employer has been notified and asks him/her to report back if the situa
tion is not corrected.
Hutton said.

"This doesn’t mean we downplay employee requests,"

"We look into all of them.

to (inspect) each one."

We just don’t send someone in
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Perhaps the most serious allegation about OSHA’s enforcement respon
sibilities is its widespread approval of state enforcement plans.

As

mentioned. Section 18 of the OSH Act allows states to submit plans to
take over OSHA functions.

The states must prove that their enforcement

and standards would be as effective as OSHA’s and that they would receive
adequate funding and authority from the state legislatures.

Section 23

also provides that states submitting plans could receive up to 90% of
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development costs if they applied by 1973 and operating costs of up to
50% thereafter.
Obviously, this was a rather lucrative opportunity.

Montana alone

received $224,000 in planning grant funds and $263,000 in operating
funds.
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All but five states submitted plans, and the Labor Department

had spent $79 million on the program by June, 1976.
Apparently regarding state plans as a means to curtail industry
opposition to workplace regulation, the Nixon Administration proposed
that states without approved plans by 1973 be allowed to operate their
own regulation programs until their plans were approved.

The AFL-CIO and

the United Steelworkers successfully petitioned for an injunction against
this plan.^^^
By 1976, 24 states had approved plans.

States have three years to

complete developmental steps after they begin operating an approved plan.
OSHA cannot make a final determination on a plan's effectiveness until
the program is completed.

In a 1976 report, the GAO said that OSHA

usually monitored a state for two years after a state program was fully
operational.

Thus, it could take up to five years before a final deter-

mination on a state plan is made.
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After reviewing the approved state plans, the GAO reported that OSHA
had no specific guidelines on adequate standards.

Eighteen of the states

had no provisions prohibiting advance notice of inspection or discrimination
against employees requesting inspections.

Twelve states did not have

authority to fine violating businesses, and seven did not guarantee
employees the right to accompany inspectors.

Severely criticizing OSHA's

apparent willingness to hand over worker protection to unprepared states.
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the GAO noted that states can get approved plans simply by including
provisions for future development of OSHA*s requirements.
In a 1978 study of OSHA’s workplace inspection program, the GAO
again questioned the effectiveness of state regulation, reporting that
the average violations cited in a state inspection were 3.3 compared with
11.3 average violations cited in inspections in which an OSHA inspector
accompanied the state officers.
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Unions widely opposed state-operated plans.

In Montana, whose plan

was approved by OSHA in 1973, pressure from state unions convinced the
1974 legislature to deny authority and funding for a state program.
State AFL-CIO Secretary Jim Murry called state enforcement "lousy" and
claimed that the industrial fatality rate in Montana was 1/3 higher than
the national a v e r a g e . T h e OCAW sent a telegram to the 1973 legislature
deploring a state plan and stating that:

"This position is based on a

long record of disappointment over how badly disabled oil workers have
fared at the hands of the state workmen's compensation agencies."
That same year, the Anaconda local of the United Steelworkers passed
a resolution, to be forwarded to legislators by the AFL-CIO, declaring
that:
Whereas that department which has served us so poorly all the
many years now proposes that it be given authority to administer
a state plan of the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act
. . . we request our legislative delegation to in every way
oppose giving to the workmen's compensation division the admin
istration of a state OSHA program such as is contemplated.
The successful union drive against a state occupational health

program may have been the result of state occupational health agencies'
reluctance to alienate state industries, an attitude that is still
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apparent.

The Bureau of Safety and Health, in the state's Department of

Labor and Industry, has some enforceable standards.

But Bureau chief

Max Salazar admits that his agency has never assessed a penalty.

Under

the law, the citation must be approved by the county attorney in the
county where the accident took place— sometimes a difficult matter,
according to Salazar.
"low profile."

But he also said that his agency likes to keep a

"Our program has to have backing," Salazar said.

"What

we want is compliance, not a lot of fines.
Larry Lloyd, chief of the Occupational Health Bureau in the Depart
ment of Health and Environmental Sciences, also stressed cooperation.
His agency, which has no enforcement powers, monitors safety and health
conditions in state and local government and is also responsible for home
conditions and radiological health.

The agency also inspects private

businesses at employer/employee request to investigate problems that
could lead to OSHA citations.
health, not police work.

As Lloyd put it:

"We're interested in

We've not had any trouble with compliance.

We

don't beat their heads in like OSHA."^^^
Another option available to employers cited by OSHA is to seek a
variance from the controls required to meet a standard.

Employers can

get a variance if they can prove that they can't comply with a standard
because of a lack of materials or because the actual construction of the
controls cannot be completed by the required date.

A variance may be

given for no more than one year and cannot be renewed more than twice.
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Originally, the Review Commission approved or denied all variance
requests.

In 1975, the Commission ruled that OSHA could approve variances.

But only the Commission can deny them, and it has been lenient.

Of 7,000
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abatement extension requests received between March, 1975 and June, 1976,
OSHA recommended denial in only 160 cases, and the Commission denied none
.
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of the requests.
The previous discussion makes it apparent that OSHA has in many
respects not taken full advantage of the enforcement powers stipulated
in the OSH Act.

Not only has the agency avoided confrontation with the

really hazardous industries in the United States, it has relinquished
much of its power to state agencies which may be unprepared or unwilling
to take an aggressive stance on occupational health issues.

As will be

discussed later, both OSHA and NIOSH seem to be improving their inspec
tion priorities, but it has taken them nearly 10 years to do so.
To illustrate the problems sometimes faced by OSHA, and the length
of time it can take to force a single industrial facility to comply with
OSHA standards, it is useful to examine a single compliance effort.

A Sample Compliance Effort
Because of the number of chemicals released during the smelting
process, copper smelters are among the most hazardous industries in the
nation.

These problems are worsened by the fact that most copper smelters

are antiquated facilities, with outdated and fairly dirty production
processes.

For these reasons, copper smelters, including the Anaconda

copper smelter which this paper will discuss, have received a fair amount
of OSHA attention.
The Anaconda company is one of Montana's largest employers, employing
about 1,000 people in the copper smelter a l o n e . I t also has a long
history of confrontation with state and federal regulatory agencies.

For

nearly eight years, the Environmental Protection Agency has been trying
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to get an adequate state Implementation plan to control sulfur dioxide
and particulate in the Anaconda area, finally promulgating one in January,

1980.171
Also useful for the purposes of this paper is the fact that INFORM,

a non-profit research group based in New York City, did an in-depth study
in 1978 of the occupational health problems in U.S. copper smelters.
Their study not only explains production processes, it examines OSHA
inspection reports, companies' medical programs and union involvement in
occupational health issues.
The smelter and the town of Anaconda have been studied by a number
of state and federal agencies.

A study of lung cancer mortality among

smelter workers, including those at the Anaconda smelter, was the basis
of the recognition that arsenic is a human carcinogen and convinced OSHA
to lower the arsenic standard to 10 micrograms per cubic meter.
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The

ACGIH standard, adopted by OSHA in 1971, was 300 micrograms, which pre
vented only skin diseases and outright poisoning.

The standard was

based on a 1963 study by the only commercial U.S. arsenic producer and
compared cancer rates in two groups of workers at the plant, one group
supposedly unexposed.

However, in a 1969 review of the study, the

National Cancer Institute discovered that it did not compare lung cancer
rates with workers outside of the facility.
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The smelter worker study examined lung cancer rates among workers
employed between 1938 and 1963 when arsenic exposure ranged from 290 to
11,270 micro grams. The study found Anaconda workers had lung cancer rates
three times the state average; among those exposed to the highest arsenic
levels, the lung cancer rate was eight times the national average.
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The study did not identify any of the smelters studied.

Despite

attempts by Montana Senator Lee Metcalf to find out whether the study
included Anaconda workers, HEW refused to identify any of the companies
when the study was first released because of industrial privacy.
The health problems in the copper industry are similar to those in
the steel industry.

Both constructed many of their facilities in the

early 1900s, and have simply built on to or remodeled existing facilities.
This haphazard evolution has resulted in economic problems for both
industries, which find themselves unable to compete with their more
efficient European and Japanese counterparts.
According to a 1973 NIOSH study of exposure levels in U.S. copper
smelters, most of the 15 primary smelters were constructed at least 50
years ago.

The study found that in half of the smelters that processed

high-arsenic ore, in-plant arsenic levels were above the then-recommended
NIOSH standard of 50 micrograms.
The arsenic exposure in copper smelters is attributable to the high
amount of arsenic in much of the ore, which ranges from .002% to 12%
after the ore has been concentrated for s m e l t i n g . A r s e n i c in ore at
the Anaconda smelter averages about .96%, a level second only to ore at
ASARCO's Tacoma smelter.
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OSHA has inspected the Anaconda smelter 19 times, more than any
Other copper smelter.
other copper states.
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This may be a result of more lax inspection in

In Arizona, for example, which has an approved

state enforcement plan, the state does not inspect smelters, leaving
that to OSHA.
fatalities.

New Mexico inspects only in cases of worker complaint or
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But the Anaconda smelter is one of the dirtiest U.S. copper smelters.
Between 1974 and 1976, injury and illness rates at the smelter were 12%
higher than the copper industry average.
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Because of the amount and variety of smelter pollutants, including
arsenic, sulfur dioxide, cadmium, lead and others, the potential health
problems faced by smelter workers are well recognized by OSHA.

Although,

as mentioned, the agency tends to stress safety over health, of the 84
copper smelter inspections OSHA conducted between 1972 and 1978, 49%
investigated health violations, compared with a national average of 17%.
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OSHA received a union request to inspect the smelter in May, 1971,
only a month after the OSH Act went into effect (Table 1).

Although the

smelter apparently was inspected, OSHA had not formally adopted any
standards, much less promulgated any of its own, and there were no
citations.
The second OSHA inspection resulted in 19 non-serious citations for
health conditions and a $235 fine.

The company immediately contested

the citations, claiming that engineering controls for noise and dust were
not feasible.

According to Susan Schermerhom of OSHA*s Region 8

Technical Support Office, companies often contest hygiene violation, even
those carrying a

small fine, because acknowledging a violation means

they may have to install some sort of controls.

By contesting the

violations, she said, companies can usually get an extended abatement
date, which in this case, the company did.
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Another inspection in 1973, done at employee request, found only one
violation.

Although it was cited as serious, it was a safety violation.

OSHA found no health violations, despite workers* complaints about

Table 1
Summary of Safety and Health Regulatory Agency Inspections
M h w -u p

Tv d *
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excessive noise, SOg, dust and fumes.

It is important to remember that

the arsenic standard at the time was 500 micrograms, 50 times higher
than the present standard.

As late as 1977, monitoring systems could not

detect arsenic levels below 150 micrograms.
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Until 1976, then, OSHA did little to monitor potential health
hazards at the smelter.

A March, 1975, inspection, done in response to

workers* complaints about health conditions, resulted in no citations or
fines.

In fact, according to the INFORM study, the OSHA office refused

to release most of the inspection results.

This may be partly due to the

fact that the complaint also claimed that a worker was fired after
"exercising employee rights under the OSH Act," and the office wanted to
protect the worker.

Another possibility is that OSHA used its 1975

findings as the basis for a five-month inspection it conducted from
September, 1975, to February, 1976, which resulted in a $45,000 fine,
later lowered to $28,645, for four willful violations, six repeated
violations, nine serious violations and 16 non-serious violations.
The company was cited for excessive arsenic, lead and copper dust
exposures and an inadequate respiratory program.

Although this author

does not have the exact levels found in this inspection, arsenic levels
had to be more than 500 micrograms and lead levels more than 200 micro
grams (the current lead standard is 50 micrograms.

A NIOSH health

hazard evaluation, conducted at worker request, found no violations of
the arsenic standard, but reported that workers in the converter aisle,
near the smelting furnaces, were exposed to levels between 50 and 70 micro
grams, five and seven times higher than the current standard.

NIOSH did

not monitor SO2 exposure because it was not specified in the union request,
but the report noted that about 80% of the converter aisle workers

57

complained about eye, nose and throat irritation and 50% to 60% about
lower respiratory tract infections, all typical responses to excessive
SO2 exposure.*
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After the 1975-76 inspection and fine, the Anaconda Company began
attempts to lower arsenic and noise levels in the smelter.

Hoods were

put on the ore concentrate and conveyor belt transfer points to control
dust emissions.

Local exhaust systems were installed around the furnaces

to prevent pressure inside them from forcing pollutants into the work
area, and hoods were installed both at the matte-tapping points (where
molten ore is "drained" to be taken to another furnace) and around the
ore ladles.

The crane cabs in the converter area were covered and venti

lated, and the converter furnace itself has a primary hood to capture
emissions.
Between 1976 and 1978, OSHA conducted five follow-up inspections to
check abatement progress, responded to five complaints and investigated
one fatality.

During all of these inspections, the company was fined a

total of $480, only $60 of which was for excessive exposure.

Apparently,

the company's engineering controls and improved respirator program
allowed it to meet the relatively lenient 500 microgram standard.

*Until recently, both OSHA and NIOSH have placed little emphasis on
sulfur dioxide exposure. The standard, unchanged since 1971, is 5 ppm,
although OSHA now wants to lower it to 2 ppm. There is growing evidence
that SO2 acts synergistically with some substances such as arsenic,
increasing their carcinogen potential. This lack of emphasis may be a
result of the fact that high in-plant SO2 levels often occur in conjunc
tion with more dangerous substances which merit agency attention. Also,
because SO2 is an irritant, workers will usually wear respirators when
levels reach about 3 ppm. Other substances such as arsenic may have no
immediate unpleasant effects, and workers are willing to tolerate higher
and more dangerous levels.
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In its 1977-78 study of copper smelters, INFORM used several
criteria to evaluate performance.

The group rated arsenic levels at and

above the proposed arsenic standard as high exposure; very high exposure
was 50 micrograms.

Sulfur dioxide levels between 2 ppm and 5 ppm were

considered high, and anything above 5 ppm was very high.
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Thus, its

evaluation of the smelter environment may give a more realistic picture
of health conditions than the fact that Anaconda was in compliance with
OSHA standards.
INFORM reported that almost all workers at the smelter were exposed
to less than 290 micrograms of arsenic, well below the standard, but at
least 20% were exposed to more than 50 micrograms.

Another 20%, most of

them workers in ore concentrate handling and around the electric furnace,
were exposed to more than 100 micrograms of lead.

INFORM did not check

SO2 levels, but it estimated that because of similar processes used in
other smelters with SO2 problems, close to 50% of the Anaconda workers
were exposed to hazardous sulfur dioxide levels.
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Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the INFORM study is that it
emphasizes that it measured minimal not optimal activities necessary to
protect workers* health.

Only the Anaconda smelter and one of Kennecott

Copper’s smelters met 80% of INFORM*s minimal criteria.

Besides docu

menting exposure levels, INFORM also evaluated in-plant industrial
hygiene programs and worker participation in health issues.
study looked for minimal efforts.

Again, the

For example, when evaluating a

company’s medical program, the company simply counted the number of
health personnel employed, not whether they were qualified or had
adequate authority.
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The study reported that it was nearly impossible
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to evaluate medical personnel’s authority because of very limited cooper
ation from the copper companies.
It also noted that health personnel may be responsible for both the
smelter and other aspects of the copper industry, such as mining and air
pollution controls, so numbers may overestimate the company's program.
The Anaconda Company employs an industrial hygenist, who spends about 75%
of his time on worker health.

The study said that until recently,

medical services at the smelter were poor, with an on-site clinic, but
no resident physician.

Only workers in the baghouse, a control process

designed to capture dust, and those exposed to asbestos were given
medical exams; these were paid for by the company, but workers had to go
on their own time.
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The new arsenic standard requires employers to provide yearly
medical exams to all workers exposed to more than five micrograms.

The

exams must include X-rays, nasal and skin examinations and sputum tests.
The physician is then to write an opinion for the employer about any

possible job-related health conditions.
employee a copy of this report.

The employer must give the

The physician has a fair amount of

latitude in determining whether an ailment is related to occupational
exposure and could be subject to some employer pressure:

One section of

the standard reads "The employer shall instruct the physician not to
reveal in the written opinion specific findings or diagnoses unrelated
to

occupational exposure.
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The Anaconda Company had attempted to weaken the medical stipulation
in the arsenic standard.

In 1975, the company, in conjunction with the

Smelter Environmental Research Association, commissioned the University
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of Utah Ifedlcal Center to study potential health problems among the
workers.

The preliminary findings of the study reported that "signifi

cantly fewer arsenic-exposed workers have evidence of inflammation of
excess amounts of white blood cells in their sputum (a possible sign of
lung cancer) than the controls."

Anaconda presented the study at the

OSHA hearings on the proposed arsenic standard as evidence that proposed
medical monitoring was unnecessary.

However, other medical experts

disputed that study, and the medical exam requirements were included in
the standard.
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Because of the standard's requirements, the Anaconda Company hired
the Tabershaw Occupational Medicine Association to perform medical exams
and explain the results to the workers.
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In November, 1978, OSHA began its first inspection of the smelter
under the new arsenic standard.

Conducted over a five-month period, the

inspection was OSHA's first attempt in the nation to enforce the new
standard.
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According to Dave DiTommaso, the industrial hygenist in charge of
the inspection, an inspection is not a matter of walking into a facility,
setting up a few monitors, taking a few readings and then deciding where
to cite a violation.

First, he said, an inspector simply walks around

the plant to become familiar with its layout and processes.

Then he/she

may set up monitors to determine levels in different areas and find out
where potential problems are.

OSHA cannot cite an employer for pollutant

levels in a plant; inspectors must prove that employees are exposed to
levels above the applicable standards.

Thus, in some cases, pollution

levels may be above the standard, but the employer will not be cited if
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employees wear respirators that prevent inhalation of more than the
allowable level.

The arsenic standard stipulates that respirators can be

used as a primary control only in areas where aigineering controls are
not feasible.
To monitor employee exposure, OSHA hygenists asked workers to wear
individual samplers during their work day.

The samplers operate on

basically the same principle as the high volume samplers used to measure
ambient particulate levels: Air is pulled into the sampler and through
a filter designed to capture various pollutants.

OSHA sends the filters

to its lab in Salt Lake City for analysis.
The OSHA inspectors also accompanied many of the workers throughout
the day to find out which areas they worked in.

Copper smelting is a

"batch" process— the ore is processed through several furnaces.

Some

workers will follow the material through these processes, so the inspec
tors must be aware of where workers may be exposed.
The OSHA inspection report showed that the highest arsenic levels
(not exposures) were around the electric furnace, the baghouse and, to a
lesser extent, the converter area.

Most were above the current standard,

but all were well below the old standard.

The extent of the problem is

best illustrated by the levels found in the lunchroom near the electric
furnace— 120 and 140 micrograms.

Even the baghouse lunchroom was lower

at 26 micrograms.
The OSHA inspection found that workers in the baghouse and around
the electric furnace received the highest arsenic exposures.
baghouse, exposures ranged from 24 to 450 micrograms.

In the

It is ironic that

the pollution control devices to limit emissions outside the workplace
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can worsen conditions for the workers who must clean and maintain them.
Workers around the electric furnace were exposed to between 30 and 300
micro grams, although one worker was exposed to 1,172 micro grams.
Although many of the workers wore respirators, OSHA issued citations
for their exposure.

This is partially because the company is required to

use engineering controls.

But it is also apparent in the citation report

that OSHA was dissatisfied with the company's respirator program.

Respi

rators were not always used and were sometimes stored in contaminated areas.
The inspector discovered that respirators used in the baghouse were
stored on a floor grating contaminated by arsenic.

The company had not

fitted the respirators to each worker and had not instructed workers how
to use them properly.
OSHA also cited the company because it did not provide the workers
with clean protective clothing at least once a week.

The arsenic

standard requires protective clothing, laundered regularly at the
facility, to protect both the workers and to prevent them from bringing
the clothing home.

This is not a matter of small concern.

It is believed

that cases of mesthelioma among the families of asbestos workers were
caused by exposure to asbestos brought home in the workers' clothes.
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Although it assigned no penalty, OSHA cited Anaconda for failing to
tell its employees where the high arsenic levels were and that they have
a right to medical surveillance.
Anaconda was cited for 24 hygiene violations, with a $2,760 fine,
and 60 safety violations, with a $2,600 fine.

Ten of the violations were

serious, and of these, four received a penalty of $480 each for arsenic
exposure, an inadequate respirator program and allowing workers to eat.
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drink and smoke in high arsenic areas.

The other six citations, with

fines of $100 each, were for violations of the engineering control
requirements, lack of protective clothing and failing to inform employees
about health hazards.

The company immediately contested the hygiene citations and the
fine.

It claimed that it had fit and trained 300 of 800 workers with

respirators, but that since training took 15 minutes per worker, it had
not had enough time to complete the respirator program.

OSHA ordered the

company to meet the standard by October, 1979, to label all arsenic
storage containers by June, 1979, and to provide protective clothing and
clean up its lunchrooms immediately.

The company claimed that these

abatement dates were not feasible.
The appeal never went before a Review Commission judge, and OSHA
lawyers began negotiating a settlement.
not an unusual procedure.

According to DiTommaso, this is

He said that although a judge must review the

final settlement, judges rarely dispute a compromise.
The agreement was not reached until June, 1980, when OSHA agreed to
lower the fine to $1,260.

Anaconda submitted a compliance plan, including

engineering studies by the American Lurgi Corporation and Flour/Furokawa,
the two firms also hired by the company to design controls to meet state
and federal air quality standards.
compliance program by early 1982.

Anaconda agreed to complete the
OSHA, however, stated that it would

not agree to accept the completed compliance plant as fulfillment of the
arsenic standard’s requirements.
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After 10 years of inspection activities, the Anaconda smelter is
just beginning to comply with standards designed to protect its workers.
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The company has understandably dragged its feet about complying with
standards that may cost it several million dollars; after all, all of the
OSHÂ citations in the past 10 years cost the company only $34,485,
considerably less than the cost of adequate pollution controls.
This discussion of efforts to clean up the Anaconda smelter illus
trates not only the length of time it can take to force a large company
to begin to comply with workplace regulations, but also the very serious
hazards faced by workers in the facility.

The cancer rates among these

workers are obviously phenomenal, and the pollution levels they are
exposed to currently are far higher than levels allowable under state and
federal standards.

For example, the new Montana standard for lead is

1.5 micrograms, compared with the new OSHA standard of 50 micrograms.
Assuming the best, by 1982, Anaconda workers will be working in an
environment considered safe according to current scientific knowledge.
According to Larry Krivan, an Anaconda Company hygenist, the company
plans to meet the OSHA compliance deadlines.

Krivan also said that the

company will contract with area physicians to conduct needed medical
exams; he said Anaconda probably will not hire an in-plant physician
because his/her findings could be considered biased.
If there is a lower dose/response relationship at lower arsenic
levels, Anaconda's adherence to the new standard may curb the astro
nomically high lung cancer rates among smelter workers.
that:

This assumes

(1) arsenic is not carcinogenic at relatively low levels, and

(2) the company will make a concerted effort to improve workplace condi
tions.

The company's motives on that score are somewhat in doubt.

testimony submitted on Montana's proposed air quality standards, for

In
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example, the company tried to refute an economic study of the health
effects of air pollution commissioned by the state Department of Health
and Environmental Sciences.

The company attacked the study, including

its assertion that a human life is worth $300,000.

Quoting a political

economist at the Harvard School of Public Health, the Anaconda testimony
stated:
The (study) assumes a value for one life of $300,000 instead of
a more accurate value of $50,000. The estimate is based on the
work of Thaler and Rosen who studied the premiums required by
young workers to enter hazardous occupations. It is too high
for older workers who are not economically productive.198

Chapter 4

WORKERS* COMPENSATION

What would happen if an Anaconda smelter worker with lung cancer
filed a claim with the state Workers* Compensation Division?
is, a very interesting test case.

The answer

According to Norm Grosfield, former

administrator of the Division, no one has ever received compensation for
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lung cancer in Montana, and he doesn*t believe anyone has even applied.
This is the case in most compensation systems in the United States.
The problem is establishing a cause/effect relationship.

All compen

sation statutes require that injuries or illnesses be work-related.

If a

worker is hit by a truck at work, breaking his leg, the causal relation
ship is clear.

But if a worker were to claim that his lung cancer was

the result of occupational exposure, even in an industry with high cancer
rates among its employees, he would have a difficult time proving that
his particular case was work-related.
The problem is illustrated by cases under the Montana silicosis
compensation system.

The silicosis fund was established in 1937, but

because of opposition from the Anaconda Company, benefits were paid out
of the general fund, not the compensation division.
were $30 a month.

Initial benefits

The present compensation division now covers silicosis,

so workers can apply to either fund.
Although the statutes specifically mention silicosis as a compensable
disease, getting benefits is not always easy.

The symptoms of silicosis

are difficult to distinguish from those of emphysema.
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Grosfield said
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that benefits are often awarded because the claimant worked in a job
known to be associated with silicosis, such as underground mining, rather
than because the worker could prove his disease was silicosis.

He said

that company lawyers will sometimes argue that a worker’s smoking habits
caused the disease.

As a result, it may be decided that occupational

exposure caused, say, 50% of the disease.

The worker would then receive

50% of total possible benefits.
Because of the increasing number of studies linking disease, parti
cularly cancer, with job exposure, some states have amended their compen
sation statutes to include occupational diseases.

New York, for example,

compensates aniline dye workers who develop bladder cancer.
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Most states, however, do not compensate many occupational diseases.
South Carolina, for example, does not compensate workers with byssinosis
or "brown lung,"
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from this disease.

although it is estimated that 35,000 workers suffer
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A recent Labor Department study of occupational disease and state
compensation reported that almost two million workers are disabled by
occupational disease.
sation benefits.
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But only 5% of these workers receive compen-

In fiscal year 1977-78, disease accounted for only

.6% of the injury data collected by the Montana compensation division.
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The irony is that compensation claims are used as part of a system
to define the extent of occupational injuries, illnesses and deaths.
Section 24 of the OSH Act requires the Labor Department to develop a
statistical system to compile injury/illness data.

The Department is

authorized to make grants to states, covering up to 90% of their initial
costs, to establish such statistical programs.

The Department also pays

68

up to 50% of the costs of the developed program, another financial
bonanza for the states.
The statistical program, under the Bureau of Labor Statistics, uses
two methods to gather Information.

The first, which Is used as the basis

for the annual BLS report on nationwide Injury/Illness rates. Is an
annual survey of selected Industries.

According to Elliot Brower, the

BLS Regional Commissioner for the Rocky Mountain states, the statistical
methods In the survey, started In 1972, are not comparable to former
methods.
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Thus, It Is difficult to compare past and present rates.

In fact, the statistical methods used by the BLS were revised four times
between 1926 and 1967.

208

The BLS compiles the employer reports In the survey and uses these
to Identify hazardous Industries.

OSHA, In theory, can then use this

Information to set Inspection priorities.

But the GAO reports that the

Illness categories used by the BLS are too broad to adequately character
ize real disease problems.

The Illness categories are:

Skin diseases,

dust diseases of the lung, respiratory problems due to toxic agents,
poisoning, disorders due to physical agents, disorders due to repeated
trauma, and "all other occupational diseases."

The GAO pointed out that

dust diseases, for example, would Include silicosis, asbestosls and
byssinosis.

Poisoning would Include overexposure to lead, carbon mon

oxide, hydrogen sulfide, pesticides and any number of other chemicals.
Thus, the survey tends to give a very general picture of disease rates,
with most diseases representing acute cases.
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This Is apparent In the statistics themselves.

Table 2 shows the

Industries with the highest Injury and Illness rates, as reported In a

Table 3

Table 2
Industries with Highest Injury and Illness
Incidence Rates, United States, 1976
SIC
code*
2011
2429
2451
3792
3715
3325
334
11
2452
2077
3321
3732
3316
2083
2088
3261
2291
241 ••
311
3538

Industry

Incidence
rates»

Meatpacking plants...............................................
Special product sawmills, n.e.c...........................
Mobile homes................................................. —
Travel trailers and campers................................
Truck trailers.............................. .......................
éteel foundries. n.e.c............................... .............
Secondary nonferrous metals..............................
Anthracite mining...................................................
Prefabricated wood buildings............................
Animal and marine fats and oils..........................
Gray iron foundries...............................................
Boat building and repairing.......... .................
Cold finishing of steel shapes............................
M a lt...................................... '..................................
Bottled and canned soft drinks ...........................
Vitreous plumbing fixtures....................................
Felt goods, except woven felts and hats..........
Logging camps and logging contractors..........
Leather tanning and finishing ...............................
Household appliances, n.e.c................................

34.7
34.5
32.0
30.3
29.3
28.4
27.5
27.4
27.2
27.1
.28.9
28.0
25.9
258
25.6
25.6
25.1
25.1
24.4
24.2

'Stêndêrd Industrial Classification Manual (SIC). 1972 Edition.
*lncldénco rate represents the number of injuries end ilinesses per 100
lüll'time workers. See appendix 0.
NOTE: n.e.c. » not elsewhere classified.

Industries with Highest Illness Incidence
Rates, United States, 1976

SIC
code'
2679
3464
2642
3875
3769
3676
365
2665
2816
3677
3914
3661
3632
2633
3635
3679
3546
302
3622
3621

Industry
Agricultural chemicals, n.e.c.............^...............
Small arms.............................................................
Polishes and sanitation goods.............................
Electronic capacltatora........................................
Space vehicle equipment, n.e.c...........................
Electronic resistors............ ................................
Ophthalmic goods.................................... ............
Cyclic crudes and intermediates........... ........
Inorganic pigments..............................................
Electronic colls and transformers.......................
, Sllvérwsre and plated w a re .......................
Telephone and telegraph apparatus...............
Household refrigerators and freezers.................
Medlcinals and botanicals........! ........................
Household vacuum cleaners................................
Electronic components, n.e.c. 1..................... .
Power driven hand to o ls ............... ......................
Rubber and plastics footw ear............................
Environmental controls.........................................
Motors and generators.........................................

Incidence
rates*
13.2
12.6
12.5
11.6
11.4
11.1
10.9
10.8
10.2
10.2
10.1
9.4
9.3
9.1
8.9
8.9*
8.7
8.6
8.6
7.8

'Incidence rate represents the number of Illnesses per 1 jOOO kilf tlme
workers. See appendix 0.
NOTE: n.e.c. - not elsewhere classified.
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1979 BLS report of 1976 rates.
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The Industries Include steel foundries,

secondary non-ferrous smelters and anthracite coal mining, all of which
are known to have severe health problems, particularly lung cancer.
However, in Table 3, which shows industries with the highest illness
rates, none of these three industries is included.

The information in

Table 3 strongly indicates that the reported illnesses are acute or
immediate symptoms of exposure.

Most of the industries listed involve

exposure to caustic agents or fumes.
The Labor Department study said that the BLS survey seldom reports
occupational cancer.
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illness is skin disease.

In fact, the most common reported occupational
212

The other data-gathering system used by the BLS is the Supplementary
Data System, which uses workers* compensation claims.

As mentioned, the

Labor Department initially funded 90% of the cost to set up this system
and now pays up to 50% of operating costs.
Montana, participate in this program.
for and received funding.
receiving 50% funding.
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About 23 states, including

Thirty-six states initially applied

By 1975, this had dropped to 27 states

In its first report from this program, the BLS

used data from only 10 states.
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The BLS established guidelines for a uniform method of coding,
processing and tabulating data among the participating states.

The

program is still in an experimental stage, but already NIOSH has ques
tioned its usefulness because compensation systems are geared toward
proving benefits, not gathering statistics.
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Another complicating factor is that a worker must file a claim
within a certain time after he/she leaves a job to receive benefits.
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This time period varies from state to state.

In Montana, a worker filing

for disease compensation must do so within three years after he/she
leaves the job; those claiming silicosis benefits have four years.
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In New York, there is no time limit, as long as workers file within 90
days after they become disabled by the disease.
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Thus, the SDS statis

tics do not include most of those workers who develop occupational
illnesses some years after they retire.
In Montana, disease victims must prove they are totally disabled
before they can receive benefits.

Injured workers can receive benefits

for both partial and total disability.

However, both ill and injured

workers can receive unlimited medical benefits.
Although all compensation laws include provisions for liberal
interpretation, it is difficult to prove that a disease with a long
latency period is occupationally related.

For one thing, diseases such

as lung cancer are not unique to particular occupations as is angiosarcoma,
for example, an extremely rare cancer found among workers exposed to
vinyl chloride.

Many diseases may result from a combination of occupa

tional exposure and workers* personal habits such as cigarette smoking.
It is doubtful that any physician would be willing to state unequivocally
that a case of lung cancer was caused by arsenic exposure.
The Montana law requires that "Occupational diseases shall be
deemed to arise out of the employment only if :
— there is a direct causal connection between the conditions under
which the work is performed and the occupational disease;
— the disease can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of
the work as a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of
the employment;
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— the disease can be fairly traced to the employment as the proximate
cause;
— the disease does not come from a hazard to which workmen would have
been equally exposed outside of the employment ;
— the disease is incidental to the character of the business and not
independent of the relation of employer and e m p l o y e e . ”218
It is often possible in the case of chronic disease to prove that
outside influences were at least partially responsible.

Grosfield said

that his experience has been that physicians are generally conservative.
He said that "You can usually get a 'possibly* out of them, but under the
law you need a preponderance of evidence.

You need a 'probably* not a

'possibility.'"
Also, most physicians are not trained to suspect a connection

between their patient's occupation and particular diseases.

According to

NIOSH, a "competent" medical person in occupational health must be aware

not only of workers' personal and family medical histories, but of the
chemicals to which they are exposed and their possible effects.
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According to a 1975 survey by the Public Health Service, Montana had only
one doctor trained in occupational medicine, and he was between 65 and
75 years old.^^^
Because state compensation systems generally do not cover many
diseases now believed to be occupationally related, many workers are
denied benefits and medical treatment.

society is considerable.

The burden on the workers and on

According to the Labor Department study, only

1.7% of the disability awards under compensation in 1978 were for occupational disease.

221

The study also reported that 53% of the workers

severely disabled by occupational disease are supported by social
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security, 21% by pensions, 17% by veterans* benefits, 16% by welfare,
5% by compensation and 1% by private insurance.

According to the Labor

Department, occupational disease is costing the social security and
welfare systems about $2.2 billion annually.
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Those workers eligible for social security receive annual payments
of about $3,900.
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By contrast, under the Montana compensation law,

benefits may be up to 2/3 of a totally disabled workers* weekly wages at
the time of disablement, not to exceed $198 a week as of June 30, 1980.
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Although it appears that workers fare better monetarily on compensation
than on social security, benefits vary from state to state.

Most states

use the 2/3 of original income guideline, but this is not always the case.
In 1978, maximum weekly benefits ranged from $87.50 in Arkansas to $654
in Alaska.
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^

This is complicated by the insurance options open to employers.

As

mentioned, only six states require employers to insure through the state
fund.

Other states allow state insurance, private insurance and self-

insurance.
Mb S t employers opt for coverage through the state or private insur
ance companies, probably because self insurers must prove their solvency
and post a bond equal to a certain percentage of their payroll.

In

fiscal year, 1977-78, only 65 Montana employers were self-insured; 9,824
had private insurance and 18,735 were enrolled in the state fund.
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State programs appear to be more cost-efficient than private insur
ance companies.

Although the state program receives no general fund

monies, it need cover only its basic operating expenses, while a private
company must make a profit.

In the monopolistic Ohio system, for example.
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96% of Its premiums go to benefits and medical expenses, compared with a
53% average for private insurance companies.
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According to John King,

chief statistician at the Montana Workers* Compensation Division, the
Montana agency uses about 15% of its income for overhead, while a private
insurance company must make about 35% of its premiums in profit.
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The defects of state compensation systems were addressed in Section
27 of the OSH Act which states that:
declares

"The Congress hereby finds and

that . . .

in recent years, serious questions have been raised concerning
the fairness and adequacy of present workmen *s compensation
laws in the light of the growth of the economy, the changing
nature of the labor force, increases in medical knowledge,
changes in the hazards associated with various types of employ
ment, new technology creating new risks and health and safety,
and increases in the general level of wages and the cost of
living."
Section 27 directed the President to appoint a 15-member National
Commission on state workmen *s compensation laws to evaluate the adequacy
of current compensation systems.

By July, 1972, the Commission was to

present its findings and recommendations to the Congress and the President.
The Commission was to evaluate amount and duration of medical and compen
sation benefits, requirements for qualifying for compensation, types of
coverage, and the relationship between compensation and other disability
programs such as social security.
The National Commission issued 84 recommendations in its 1972 report,
19 of which it considered the "essential recommendations for a workmen*s
compensation program."
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Most of these "essential" recommendations were

already incorporated in the more progressive state systems.

These

included coverage of household and agricultural workers and professional
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athleteâ and a mandatory stipulation that maximum weekly benefits be at
least 2/3 of a worker^s gross weekly pay.

The Commission also stressed

that "all states provide full coverage for work-related disease."
The Commission obviously regarded the remaining 65 "desirable but
not essential" recommendations part of a future effort to Improve compen
sation systems.

Envisioned was an Increase In maximum weekly benefits to

80% of a worker^s "spendable weekly earnings."

These "desirable" recom

mendations also reflected an Increasing awareness of occupational disease
problems.

The Commission wanted to see professional "disability evalu

ation units" set up In compensation agencies to determine the relationship
of disease to employment.

Recognizing the problem Grosfield mentioned—

the need for a preponderance of evidence In disease cases— the Commission
recommended that "full compensation benefits be paid for an Impairment or
death resulting from both work-related and nonwork-related causes If the
work-related factor was a significant cause of the Impairment or death."
The Commission also recommended that a claimant be allowed to file a
claim three years "after the claimant knew or, by exercise of reasonable
diligence should have known, of the Impairment and Its possible relation
ship to his employment."
Other Commission recommendations Included more lenient benefits to
survivors, better and mandatory rehabilitation programs, evaluation of
current Insurance programs to determine whether state, private or selfinsurance were more effective, and programs to Insure that employees are
aware of their rights under compensation systems.
In 1973, Senators Harrison Williams of New Jersey and Jacob Javlts
of New York Introduced the National Workers’ Compensation Act to Implement
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the National Commission's recommendations.

The bill, which recognized

that "injuries, diseases and deaths arising out of and in the course of
employment, constitute a burden upon interstate commerce and have a sub
stantial adverse effect upon the general welfare," would have required
workers’ compensation systems to include "universal coverage of employees
and work-related injuries and disease, substantial protection against
interruption of income, provision of prompt and adequate medical care and
rehabilitation services in order to correct work-related injuries and to
restore such injured workers to gainful employment, encouragement of
safety, and an effective system for delivery of benefits and services."
The bill called for certain standards for compensation systems,
including the 2/3 maximum weekly benefit, unlimited medical treatment,
mandatory rehabilitation services and periodic adjustment of benefits to
reflect increases in state average weekly wages.

The bill also would

have required HEW, through NIOSH, to recommend ways in which to determine
whether a disease is occupationally-related.

On the basis of these recom

mendations, OSHA would be able to promulgate standards which mentioned
specific diseases associated with the substance.

In other words, OSHA

could establish presumptions about the origin of occupational diseases.
President Nixon refused to endorse the compensation bill, but asked
states to voluntarily reform their compensation systems to meet the 19
"essential" recommendations.
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The bill was widely opposed by industry.

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce estimated that expanding compensation
systems to cover disease would cost an additional $40 billion annually,
which, as Daniel Berman points out, "makes sense if occupational disease
kills 100,000 people a year.
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The bill was re-introduced in 1975 in both the House and the Senate,
but again failed.
date.

There has been no further action on the legislation to

Chapter 5

CONCLUSION-CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

OSHA and NIOSH
OSHA’s ten-year history is characterized by slow progress away from
its initial caution and lack of direction and by numerous, often success
ful Industry challenges of its authority.
court cases have seriously

As mentioned, a number of

threatened the agency's ability to set

standards to protect workers from occupational diseases.
OSHA's ability to Inspect workplaces has also been attacked in the
courts.

The agency's authority to make unannounced inspections was

challenged by an Idaho firm, and in June, 1978, the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled that warrantless inspections violate employers’ Constitutional
rights.

However, the Court ruled that OSHA need obtain only an ex parte

warrant— which doesn't require the knowledge of the party to be served
and need only demonstrate probable cause for inspection.
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According to an industrial hygenist in the Billings area office,
inspectors don't need a warrant unless an employer demands one.

He said

that if an employer uses a warrant request to gain time, OSHA may take
him/her to court for "concealment."
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It is important to remember that OSHA and NIOSH are fledgling
agencies which began operating during a conservative Administration that
was philosophically, if not overtly, opposed to extensive federal regu
lation of industry.

After emerging from this dampening Influence, both

agencies have begun tentative efforts to more aggressively address
78
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workplace health conditions.

What Is perhaps most encouraging is that

these steps are being taken in spite of the many legal setbacks.
After OSHA Administrator Eula Bingham took office in 1977, she
announced that OSHA general inspections would begin focusing on particu
larly hazardous industries, with special emphasis on exposure to silica,
lead, mercury, benzene and pesticides.
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Although the Anaconda case

history indicates that OSHA has been less patient with employers slow to
clean up their facilities, inspection priorities appear to be left largely
to the OSHA area offices.
Harry Hutton, director of the Billings area office, said that he
does not receive direct suggestions from the national or regional offices
to concentrate on certain industries.

But, he said, area offices are

encouraged to identify and focus on the hazardous industries in their
areas.

Hutton said that after the Billings office was opened in 1971-72,

he used state Department of Commerce data to discover county business
patterns.

He then checked the classified section of phone books to find

the major local businesses and contacted the Chamber of Commerce to get
industry size information.
Hutton said his office initially used information supplied by the
state Workers* Compensation Division, which provided "very adequate"
injury rates.

But he said that compensation data are now too limited

for OSHA purposes.

The state uses Standard Industrial Classification

(SIC) codes to classify injury/illness rates in various industries.
But the state uses a three-digit code instead of the more precise four
digit code.

Hutton explained that a three-digit code would show, for

example, that a particular business was involved in meat processing.
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but a four-dlglt code would identify the business as meat packing,
poultry processing, etc.
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Thus, It appears that although OSHÂ may be shifting Its attention
to health Issues, It Is a vague policy, transmitted through a sort of
osmosis to area offices without precise directives on priorities.
The agency Is making a more directed effort to Improve Its standardsetting process.

Obviously realizing that Its standard-by-standard promul

gation process could take years to cover the many toxic substances that
need regulation, OSHA announced In January, 1980, that It would classify
and regulate carcinogens and then require the same general engineering
controls and hygiene practices for all of them.
policy Is somewhat In doubt, however:

The future of this new

The American Petroleum Institute

has asked the Fifth Circuit Court to review the carcinogen policy.
OSHA has also begun to use methods other than standards to protect
workers.

The agency has proposed a rule allowing workers access to

medical records kept by companies, and the aresenlc standard requires
employers to give workers the results of company-financed medical exams.
The new lead standard Is an example of a policy OSHA plans to
continue In the future.

The standard has a unique "rate retention'*

clause which requires employers to move workers from lead-contaminated
areas If their blood lead levels exceed a certain concentration.
who are moved must retain their original pay rate.

Workers

The Injunction

against certain portions of the lead standard did not affect the rate
retention provision.
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One of OSHA's most Important moves was to back workers* rights to
refuse extremely dangerous work.

Before OSHA, workers did have limited
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rights to refuse work that might cause death or serious injury.

Section

502 of the 1935 Wagner Act, which regulates labor relations in the
private sector, states that "Nor shall the quitting of labor by an
employee or employees in good faith because of abnormally dangerous
conditions for work . . . be deemed a strike."

However, the U.S. Supreme

Court ruled in 1974 that Section 502 protects a strike only when the
employees can produce "objective evidence of imminent danger."
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During debate over the OSH Act, Congress rejected a provision that
would have allowed workers to refuse unsafe work without loss of pay.
The only relief for imminent danger situations in the final bill allowed
an inspector to seek an injunction against a facility.
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In 1973, OSHA

adopted a rule that an employee could refuse dangerous work, without pay,
if he/she first tried to get the employer to do something about it.
Later, a worker sued his employer on the basis of this rule after he was
fired when he refused to return to work on a 150-foot steel skeleton
because of high winds.

The Fifth Circuit Court ruled that the Secretary

of Labor exceeded his authority under the OSH Act by issuing the rule,
and the U.S. Supreme Court deniéd review of the appeal.
But in February, 1980, the Court reversed itself.
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The case involved

two workers at a Whirlpool factory who refused to work on a steel mesh
guard screen that caught appliance parts that fell from overhead conveyor
belts.

There had been a number of accidents on the screen, including a

worker who fell to his death.

A federal district court ruled against the

workers, and the Labor Department appealed the case to the Sixth Circuit
Court.

The court reversed the lower court ruling, acknowledging the

conflict with the previous decision.
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Whirlpool appealed the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court which
granted review because of conflicts in two other circuit courts on
similar cases.

The Court upheld OSHA*s rule, even though the OSH Act

does not specifically mention workers* right to refuse dangerous work.
The decision cited Section 11(c)(1) of the Act which prohibits employers
from discriminating against workers who exercise *'any right afforded by
the Act.*'

Noting that the law was passed to prevent occupational

injuries, illnesses and death, the Court ruled that the rule "conforms
to the fundamental objective of the Act."

However, workers citing the

rule must prove that they had tried to get employers to correct the
situation, and they cannot expect wages for the time they *re off the job.^^^
NIOSH also has initiated programs to take a more active role in
preventing or ameliorating occupational disease.

The agency initially

limited its efforts to what might be called purely scientific activities—
preparing lists of toxic chemicals, doing epidemiology studies and
preparing the highly technical criteria documents.

The agency*s stance

on pollution limits is more aggressive than OSHA* s, but this is generally
an in-house matter.

The fact is, that although NIOSH studies workers and

their health problems and has recommended numerous standards, engineering
controls and hygiene practices to protect them, it has done little about
the actual effects of exposure on workers, perhaps fearing charges of
activism in what is considered a research agency.
In 1977, it was revealed that NIOSH had collected the names and
addresses of 74,000 workers at risk of developing cancer because of
exposure to asbestos, aniline dyes and other suspected carcinogens.

The

agency had not contacted the workers to tell them of their higher risk.
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Obviously flustered by the disclosure. Dr. John Finlea, NIOSH director,
said that the agency did not have the authority to release the names.
But NIOSH*s Office of Extramural Coordination and Special Projects
expressed fear that if some of the workers subsequently developed cancer,
the government could be sued.
In response to this criticism, NIOSH is developing a unique notifi
cation/aid program to help workers exposed to carcinogens.

Now in its

pilot stage, the program is a joint effort between NIOSH and the Workers*
Institute for Safety and Health, a Washington, D.C., research center
largely supported by the AFL-CIO.

The program was started to set up

community self-help programs for exposed workers in response to what
Paul Schulte, NIOSH*s coordinator of the program, called "our biggest
responsibility.

We*ve got to start taking responsibility for the infor

mation that we have."
The program, which Schulte hopes will begin operating in 1981,
begins with the identification of the individuals at risk.

NIOSH first

asks the companies and/or the union for a list of all workers who are
working or have worked at the plant.
out who*s dead."

Then, as Schulte put it, "we find

If a worker is alive, NIOSH uses a number of methods

to find his/her current address, including car registration records,
social security and Internal Revenue Service records.

The workers are

then notified and given a local number or address to contact NIOSH.
But the program will go beyond simple information.
be left in the community when we leave," Schulte said.

"Something must
NIOSH will try to

form a community support program, with doctors, lawyers, psychologists,
social service workers and others.

Schulte said that although the
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program is intended to help the workers immediately, it is also envisioned
as a way to bring relief from other programs.

Calling current workers*

compensation systems "atrocities," he explained that community programs
of this sort could eventually pressure legislatures to amend compensation
requirements.
Schulte said the program's primary defect is the nature of some
occupational diseases.

The pilot program is geared toward workers

exposed to aniline dyes.

The dyes can cause bladder cancer which, if

detected early, has a very good cure rate.

However, lung cancer, the

most common occupational cancer, has a very poor cure rate, even with
early detection.

Thus, Schulte said, even a program which emphasized

early detection would do little to reduce the initial problem.
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So the focus returns to the workplace itself and the need to limit
workers * exposure to toxic substances.

If OSHA is forced to do in-depth

cost/benefit analyses for each of its standards, the point may be moot—
the agency essentially will be stripped of its authority to reduce
exposure if it strongly suspects, but cannot currently prove, that a
chemical may have long-term adverse effects.

It seems clear that legis

lation is needed to more clearly define OSHA's powers and circumvent the
effects of recent court decisions.

The success of actions of this sort

may well depend on the support of those the OSH Act was designed to
protect— the workers themselves.

Workers and Workplace Regulation
The results of occupational health studies are now being used by
some environmental groups.

The Environmental Defense Fund and the

Natural Resources Defense Council, for example, have asked the Consumer
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Product Safety Commission to ban fireplace logs and other household
products containing asbestos.
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The American Lung Association recently

issed a series of pamphlets on respiratory problems associated with
various workplace pollutants.
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But the group most actively promoting better workplace conditions is
organized labor.

Many of the epidemiology studies which established

connections between disease and workplace pollutants were done at the
request of labor unions.

Unions have been the most aggressive supporters

of engineering controls rather than respirators.

This is largely because

respirators are uncomfortable, and some workers won*t wear them unless
pollutants irritate them, which is often not the case.

Respirators are

also difficult to breathe through (as this author learned after trying
some on at the Billings area office), and they irritate skin in hot
conditions when sweat builds up around the seal.
Since the OSH Act was passed, many unions have used its provisions
allowing employee participation in workplace regulation to strengthen
their rights to a healthful environment.

By 1972, 35 of the 116 unions

affiliated with the AFL-CIO had full-time safety and health directors.
The primary issues in a 1974 OCAW strike was to gain access to medical
and personnel records.

Four thousand members of the unions went on

strike demanding an independent scientific survey of health conditions,
company-paid medical exams, and information about illness and death rates.
After four-and-a-half months, the union gained access to sickness and
^
1- rates. 247
death
Unions have also begun to demand increasingly stringent provisions
on workers* rights to a safe environment in their contracts.

Both the
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United Steelworkers and the OCAW contracts provide for a joint labor/
management safety and health committee to meet on a regular basis.

The

OCAW contract says that the company must maintain an independent indus
trial health consultant, accepted by the union, to do industrial health
surveys measuring workers* exposure and, if deemed necessary, conduct
medical exams.

The union is to receive copies of all such information.

The contract also states that "No employee shall be required to perform
services that seriously endanger his physical safety, and his refusal to
do so shall not warrant or justify discharge or suspension."
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The Steelworkers contract also specifies a joint committee to
conduct monthly inspections and recommend any needed corrections.

The

company must inform the union about any new chemicals or processes and
the hazards associated with them.

The contract also stipulates a rate

retention provision, forcing the company to pay an employee who must be
moved to another job because of excessive exposure the same pay rate.
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Although unions are in the forefront of efforts to improve work
place conditions, their efforts could be limited by one very important
consideration:
not working.

A safe and healthful workplace is meaningless if you*re
It is significant that unions began lobbying heavily for

safety and health improvements in the late 1960s and early *70s when
economic conditions were good.

However, as the country moved into a

series of recessions in the middle *70s, with associated production cut
backs, some workers began to worry that requirements for pollution
controls would force companies to cut back other areas of spending, i.e.,
jobs.

During the OSHA hearings on the arsenic standard, for example,

the national United Steelworkers office strongly supported a complete ban
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on arsenic exposure.

But the union’s locals were hesitant.

The local

in Tacoma, site of the ASARCO copper smelter which processes the highest
arsenic ore in the country, claimed the ban was an ideal, not a target.
As a union official stated in an interview:
We know we can’t trade lives for jobs. We want the company
pushed far as possible to clean up this plant. But if they’re
pushed long and hard enough, there’s a definite possibility
that the place will close down, and we’re talking about 600
union members.250
The union’s fears are not groundless.

In the steel industry alone,

U.S. Steel has announced that it is closing 15 plants in eight states,
representing a loss of 13,000 jobs, or 8% of the entire steel workforce.
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And there is some evidence that unions will back industrial develop
ment despite obvious occupational hazards.

At a February, 1979, meeting

of the AFL-CIO executive council, there was broad support for acceleration
of nuclear power plant construction.

The council’s resolution supported

increased construction, noting that construction and operation of
proposed plants would provide wages between $5 million and $10 million
annually.

Only the machinists unions voted against the resoltuion.

And

only the OCAW has expressed concern about the safety of power plant
workers : The union suggested that contracts allow workers to get their
original wages if a plant must be shut down or if workers must be
transferred because of excessive radiation exposure.
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Despite continuing economic pressure, however, unions still are
pressing for good workplace safety and health requirements, although
their attitude is sometimes ambivalent when new jobs are at stake.

This

is evident in a list of the Montana state AFL-CIO convention resolutions
on environmental issues between 1968 and 1979:
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1968:

Urged the state and federal governments to adopt legislation
preventing air, land and water pollution.

1969:

Opposed use of DDT and asked for legislation allowing workers
to request U.S. Public Health Service medical exams.

1970:

Condemned clear-cutting, but asked for more studies before
additional areas were designated wilderness.

Opposed a

moratorium on timber sales in Rock Creek.
1971:

Supported legislation to regulate industry to attain maximum
employment with minimal environmental harm.
also stated:

This resolution

"We cannot agree to allowing variances in this

nor shall we permit them (industry) to frighten us with threats
to 'pull out* or 'shut down' if they are forced to comply,"
1973:

Supported a publicly-owned utility system and state efforts
to control sulfur dioxide pollution.

Supported AFL-CIO

executive board efforts to support the state's stiff stripmining reclamation laws, stating that "these corporations,
which have little interest in Montana except for the profits
they can derive from exploitation of our resources and our
people, have invariably opposed all effort to improve the
social and economic well being of the

people of Montana.

The profit dollar is all-important to the exclusion of every
other consideration."

Opposed the proposed state plan to

take over OSHA regulations and enforcement duties.
1974:

Supported recycling legislation, rejecting the "contention
that jobs must be sacrificed to preserve the environment."
Supported a higher coal severance tax.
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1975:

Condemned

the Montana Power Company's support for a state

sales tax and for right-to-work laws.Endorsed the Colstrip
Units 3 and 4 coal-fired power plants, but discouraged union
collaboration with MPC.

Supported recycling of all waste

materials without taxes or deposits on non-disposable
containers.

Supported public utility districts.

Supported

utility rate structures favoring residential and small
business consumers rather than large industrial consumers.
Urged completion of Libby Dam.
1976:

Supported legislation to increase the power output in the
Pacific Northwest.
all waste.

Urged legislation requiring recycling of

Supported railraod transportation of coal rather

than slurry pipelines.

Opposed giving the right of eminent

domain to any private interests.

Condemned the relocation

of the only OSHA analysis laboratory from Utah to West
Virginia.
Montana.

Urged increased OSHA enforcement efforts in
Opposed an initiative limiting nuclear power

plants in the state.
1977:

Favored withholding wilderness status until "proper studies"
are made.

Supported public utility districts.

OSHA enforcement.
enforcement.
1978:

Urged stronger

Urged stronger Mine Safety and Health Act

Favored the Northern Tier pipeline.

Favored the Northern Tier Pipeline built under strict environ
mental controls.

Supported the 30% coal severance tax and

urged termination of leases with companies protesting the tax.
Urged the U.S. Supreme Court to reconsider its decision
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forcing OSHA inspectors to get search warrants.

Favored the

Northern Tier pipeline over the Kitimat route.
tion of the RARE II studies.

Urged comple

Opposed use of water in coal

slurry pipelines.
1979:

Favored development of alternative energy sources.

Admonished

big oil companies for creating shortages to justify price
increases and urged the Montana Congressional delegation to
force oil companies to open their books and find a means to
control excessive corporate profits.

Supported MHD.

Asked

Congress to break up the monopoly of big oil companies and
exploration and distribution activities.

Called for "just

and reasonable" energy policies, preservation of jobs, safe
energy and breaking up the power of the energy industry.
Opposed lifting controls on domestic oil prices.
nationalization of oil companies.

Supported

Urged support of the

Northern Tier pipeline.
In the face of increasing economic pressures, unions also appear to
be turning to measures that will protect both workers * health and their
incomes.

According to a press release by the United Steelworkers,

Section 321 of the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments allows workers to
request an EPA investigation if their employer claims that pollution
controls will cause job losses.

EPA can subpoena company records to

determine whether controls would force a company to curtail production
or whether the company was planning to close down anyway.

According to

the press release, this clause has been used only once, but "as more
people become aware of its existence, it can become a very effective tool
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not only for clearing the air where job loss threats are claimed, but
also for preventing groundless claims from being made."
Section 322 of the Amendments allows workers who believe they have
been discriminated against because they support pollution control to
also appeal.

This provision is weak because although it would reinstate

an employee unfairly penalized, it provides no punitive damages against
the employer.

Also, an employee who decides to use this provision faces

an appeal process that could last up to three months:

Upon receiving an

appeal, the Labor Department must conduct an investigation within 30
days.

Within 60 days after the investigation, the department must issue

a formal decision on the matter.
The Amendments also contain provisions to help workers laid off
because of "environmental shutdowns."

After a one-year study of such

cases by the Labor Department, the government theoretically can grant
supplemental unemployment benefits, job re-training and relocation assis
tance.

The law does not provide automatic assistance, but provides a

basis for Congressional action.
In an interesting recognition of the use of economic threats, the
Amendments specifically forbid non-ferrous smelters (copper, lead and
zinc) which wish to use intermittent controls to lay off workers or
reduce their hours.

Intermittent controls mean that if a company

realizes that it is violating air quality standards and it cannot yet use
engineering controls, it will simply slow production to reduce emissions,
often reducing work hours to do so.

Under the law, a company may use

this type of control, but must pay workers full production wages.
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Another example of union support of measures to limit economic
threats by Industry is the Montana AFL-CIO sponsored plant closure initia
tive.

Although the initiative did not get enough signatures to be placed

on the November, 1980, ballot, there will probably be similar attempts in
the future.

The initiative would have required companies with more than

50 employees to give one-year advance notice of large layoffs and provide

up to $25,000 in severance pay to laid-off workers.

Other provisions

included health insurance for up to six months after a closure and
programs to provide other employment in the affected community.
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It also appears that industry intimidation attempts are not always
effective when safety and health issues are involved.

During consider

ation in the 1979 Montana legislative session of House Joint Resolution
26, which urged Congress to weaken the OSH Act and other industrial
regulations because they impeded industrial development, workers construc
ting an acid plant at the East Helena lead smelter testified against the
measure before the Senate Business and Industry Committee.

Citing

continuing lead problems at the smelter, one worker testified, "Ive seen
the benefits of OSHA.

I ’ve seen the day we washed parts with our hands

using chemicals we had no business touching.

Not now."^^^

The resolu

tion, sponsored by an East Helena representative, passed the House 81-14.
It was defeated in the Senate by a vote of 26-19.
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And in Butte, a town plagued by economic setbacks in recent years,
1,200 members of the Butte Miners’ Union went out on strike in June, 1980,
charging that the Anaconda Company did not adhere to mine safety standards
and did not allow workers’ representatives to accompany safety inspectors.
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As the union president put it:

"It*s a matter of tic-tac-toe whether

you come out of the mine alive."
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Thus, union support for workplace regulation appears to be strong
despite economic constraints.

The question now is, is this support

enough to insure adequate workplace regulation and improved compensation
systems?

Suggestions for Improvement
The Workers * Role
Although it can be assumed that unions will continue to support
measures furthering workers* safety and health, employees* ability to
lobby for such issues depends, to some extent, on whether they are
unionized.

Only 24% of the nation*s workforce currently is unionized.
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However, because they are organized and wield a fair amount of political
clout, unions could use a number of approaches to improve workplace
conditions: *
— More stringent provisions in contracts for company-financed medi
cal exams and worker access to medical and exposure records.
— Standardized cross-union stipulations on safety and health issues.
One example of this is union cooperation at the Anaconda smelter,
where there are a number of unions who cooperatively negotiate on
contract safety and health stipulations. Unions could band to
gether in regional committees to share information and come up
with safety and health issues important in similar industries.
— Organize efforts to obtain government or company funds to train
workers in safety and health issues so that they could recognize
potential workplace problems.

*Most of the following suggestions are taken from Daniel Berman* s
Death on the Job.
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Federal Regulation
It is, of course, difficult to separate issues that unions could
initiate or support from improvements that could be made in regulating
agencies.

However, most of the following suggestions would require

either legislation or agency promulgation, so can be separated from
possible union actions :
— Legislation to strengthen the enforcement and standard-setting
power weakened by recent court decisions. As discussed, federal
and state ambient air quality standards assume that human health
must be protected regardless of economic cost. The OSH Act should
be amended to allow workers* health the same consideration.
— More use of information generated by federal evaluations of pos
sible workplace hazards. OSHA should make better use of NIOSH
health hazard evaluation data to decide which industries should be
inspected. Not only would this policy identify particularly
hazardous industries, it would help eliminate the ’’nit-picking”
inspections that have garnered so much industry criticism.
— An expansion of OSHA’s recent attempts to categorize and regulate
workplace pollutants generically. Industry so far has challenged
every health standard OSHA has promulgated. Although ’’generic
standards” would undoubtedly also be challenged, the issues could
be settled in one court case rather than spread through various
circuit courts.
— More stipulations such as the rate retention clause in the lead
standard. Provisions of this sort would force industries that
were slow to install needed engineering controls to more danger
ously exposed workers without endangering their livelihood.
— An expansion of programs such as NIOSH’s pilot effort to identify
and help workers exposed to carcinogens. Not only would this aid
the workers at risk, it would educate the affected communities
about the issues involved and encourage them to seek changes in
both workplace regulation and compensation laws.
— An investigation by OSHA or by an ’’objective” agency such as the
General Accounting Office of the relationship between needed
pollution controls and production efficiency. Many of the more
hazardous industries are older facilities where a complete over
haul of their processes would both lessen workplace pollutants
and increase production capacity.
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Workers* Compensation
Of all worker health Issues, compensation deficiencies have received
the least amount of attention.

Research is desperately needed on the

different state compensation systems, how well they compensate occupa
tional diseases and what kind of legislation is needed to correct
existing problems.

There is some evidence that court action may

encourage some legislative reform.

As explained in the first chapter,

the compensation concept largely replaced negligence suits for workrelated injuries and deaths.

But workers who do not receive compensation

and believe that their injury or illness was a result of workplace condi
tions can, theoretically at least, sue for damages.
In 1974, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a jury award of
$79,000 to the widow of an insulation worker who died of lung cancer
after years of asbestos exposure.

The Court ruled that an industry

using materials known to be hazardous had special obligations beyond
meeting existing safety standards.
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Although successful suits of this sort against industry appear to
be few, there is now a trend to hold government responsible because it is
supposed to insure workplace safety under OSHA

and other statutes.

The

general rule has been that sovereign immunity protects the government
from most class action suits.

But broader interpretations of the 1959

Federal Tort Claims Act allow suits based on general tort liability—
personal or property damage caused by federal employees— after the particular agency has a chance to settle administratively.
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In December, 1977, the Justice Department agreed to pay $5.7 million
to 400 former asbestos fabricators.

The workers claimed that the Public
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Health Service kept secret the results of several factory inspections
and medical exams it conducted in the 1960s, thereby increasing the
workers* likelihood of developing lung cancer or asbestosis.

The inspec

tions were done before OSHA and the government refused to admit liability.
But the payment itself may mark a precedent for future cases.
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In 1979, a veteran suffering from cancer of the lymph system was
granted veterans' benefits.

He based his case on the fact that he was

exposed to radiation during aboveground nuclear bomb testing in the 1950s.
The Board of Veterans* Appeals, which granted the award, is not bound by
precedent or subject to judicial review.

However, its ruling would seem

a de facto acknowledgment and may mark possible benefits for several
hundred veterans who have filed similar appeals.
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Several veterans exposed to Agent Orange, a defoliant used during
the Vietnam War, have filed suit against the Dow Chemical Company and
several other herbicide manufacturers alleging a number of ailments,
particularly nerve disorders.
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These and similar suits probable in the future as the results of
present exposure to various chemicals may well prompt legislation to
amend compensation statutes.

Already one bill has been introduced in the

U.S. Senate which would force chemical companies and other hazardous
industries to set up a special fund to pay victims

medical bills.
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Because of the large awards in successful negligence suits, similar
court actions may force states to amend their compensation suits to specify
occupational diseases.

And it is not unlikely that the same fear of large

awards will convince industry to support these changes, in an interesting
repeat of corporate support of compensation systems in the early 1900s.
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